Security in the Mediterranean region. Assembly of Western European Union Forty-Second Session Document 1543, 4 November 1996 by de Lipkowski, Mr.
--*9-'
Assembly of Western European Union
DOCUMENT T543 4 November 1996
FORTY-SECOND SESSION
Security in the Mediterranean region
REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr de Lipkowski, Rapporteur
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du President-Wilson, '75'775Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 01 53 6'7.22 00
Document 1543 4 November 1996
Security in the Mediterrqnean region
REPORT'
submitted on behalf of the Political Committed
by Mr de Lipkowski, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on securitl'rr the Mediterrzurean region
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDLM
submrtted b1'Mr de Lrpkowskr, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
IL Assessment of the situation throughout the Medrterranean
A Regronal conflicts affectrng securrtv in the Mediterranean
I Developments in the Middle East peace process
2. Crrses involving Turkey. Syna, Iraq and Iran
3. Crrses betu'een countries in North Africa
4. Cyprus and disputes betrveen Greece and Turkel,
5. The impact of the conflrct in the Balkans on Euro-Mediterranean
relations
B. General problems in Euro-Mediterranean relatrons
l. The repercussions of economrc. social and demographrc change
on Euro-Medrterranean relatrons
2 Political Islamism
3. The fight agarnst terrorism and organised cnme
4. Trends rn military expenditure m the rcgron
l. Adopted in Commrttee b1' 18 votes to 0 u,ith 1 abstention
2. ]'lembers of the Connnttee. Mr de Paig (Chairman); Mr Roseta (Vice-Chairman), MM Antretter, de
Assis, Blaauv', Sir Andrew Borvden. MM Buhler. Caputo (Alternate: -lrata). Mr Cronr (Alternate. Diomsr),
MM Dras, Ehrmann. E1'skens. Fassino (Alternate: Benvenutr), Mr Irmer, Sir Rilsse// Johnston, MM Jurgens,
Kaspereit (Alternate. Baumel), Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: |,Iarshall), MM Koschi'k. Liaprs, van der Lrnden, de
Lrpkowski, Maass, Van der Maelen (Alternate: Staes), Mr Martinez Casan (Alternate: Martinez), NfrvI
Pottakis. Pozzo. Puche Rodriguez. Recoder, Rrppinger, Rokoflllos, Rodeghrero, Seitlinger, Sr Keih Speed,
lvfrl L:rbam, Vingon. N ... (Alternate. Davrs).
Assoctate members. lvfrvl Godal, Kamhi, Kulahli.




5. The proliferatron of weapons of mass destruction and their
means ofconveyance
6. Promotrng arms control and disarmament
7 The rmportance of public oprnron
Policy options for Europe and for WEU
Conclusions
l. The condrtions for a Mediterranean policy
2. AnArab policy for Europe
3. A cautious approach
Joint letter from the President of the French Republic, Mr Jacques
Chirac, the German Chancellor, Mr Helmut Kohl, and the British
Prrme Minister, Mr John Ma1or, to the Presrdent of the Palestinian
Authority, Mr Yasser Arafat
Jornt letter from the Presrdent of the French Republic, Mr Jacques
Chirac, the German Chancellor, Mr Helmut Kohl, and the Brrtish
Prime Minister, Mr John Major, to the Israeh Pnme Minrster, Mr
Benjamin Netanyahu
Morocco's approach to secunty and defence in the Medrterranean
briefing grven by Divrsronal General Abdelhak El Kadiri of the








on securillt in the Meditettanean region
The Assembly,
(i) Consrdenng that there can be no secuntv rr Europe unless lastrng peace is established rn the
Medrterranean region;
(ii) Consrderurg that relations between the peoples in the northem and southem Medrterranean are
handicapped by unequal economic and social development, insufficrent cultural and religious exchanges, a
poor understandrng ofthe political objectives pursued by various parties and, ur rnany cases, an unjustified
vrew of the armed forces:
(nt) Takrng the uew that respect for the right of a pmple to selfdetermination, the nghts of etlu:rc, cultural
and religious mmonties, human nghts and democratic principles constitutes the fundamental basis for
establishrng an order of peace and cooperation in the Mediterranean,
(O Welcomrng the uutiatives taken by the Medrterranean coastal slates, the European Uruon, and
particularly the Barcelona Conference, with a new to establishing a lastrng order of peace m the regron, rvhile
regrettng that WEU has so far not been rnvolved ur them,
(v) Considenng, however, that a dralogue on economic, social and cultural measures wrll not suffice to
establish such an order and must also extend to forergn and secunty policy;
(w) Regretturg that the WEU Medterranean Group has not yet managed to engage effectively m such a
dialogue;
(vi) Consrdenng further that many local problems and conflicts that are still unresolved constitute serious
obstacles to the estabhshment of the abovementioned order of peace and are prone to arouse rr the southem
Mediterranean populatrons hostile feelings towards the West, and that the persrstence of such conflicts
comphcates the efforts of many govemments to establish an order of peace and cooperatron m the region;
(.rr) Takng the uew that the drrect urterest of the European Uruon hes rn the solution of problems and the
abatement of conflrcts grven tlrat it is the maur tradrng parbrer of the countnes of the region and that it
provides them with substantral economrc aid;
A9 Considering, in additioq tlnt the Uruted States has a considerable mrlitary and naval presence rn the
Mediterranean, making it an essentral partrer for Europe in the search for such solutions;
(x) Recallng ttnt WEU has been given a remrt to complement NATO activities to further rntemational
peace, and that in Petersberg it decided rt would act on behalf of the European Uruon as soon as the latter has
defined a common foreign and secunty policy leadrng to the urtervention of armed forces;
(xr) Obsemng wrth concem that the reductions the rest of Europe is making in defence budgets, armed
forces and armaments are not being made rn numy coturtnes south and east of the Mediterranean,
(xii) Recallrrg the need for effective me€us to combat terrorism, cnmural orgarusations and drug traffickrng
in the form of coordrnated action on the part of all the Medrterranean countnes;
(xiit) Stressrng how sensitive the Muslim world is to the fate of Mushms ur Europe and particularly in
Bosrua and Herzegolrrn;
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(nv) Recalhng Assembll' Rccommendatron 538 and reaffirmmg, rvith a vierv to a global secun!- concept, rts
mterest m the development and n'ell-berng of all the southem and eastem Me&terranean countncs and rr the
maintenance of peace and stabrlft)'rr the regron,
RECOMMENDS TFIAT THE COI.INCIL
l. Subnut specrfic proposals to the Europear Umon ulth a vierv to includlrg secuntv matters rn thc
consultatron process rt rmtrated m Barcelona urth the Mediterranean countnes, and plal' an actrve part rn that
process,
2 Include m rts proposals prorasions for the controlled hmrtatron of armaments and the wholesale
chmrnation of u'eapons of mass destruction in the region, maml1,'through
(a) non-prohferatron of nuclear weapons,
(b) a limitation on the number and range of missiles deplo1'ed in the region,
@ the prohrbitron of chemical and brological \\,eapons production and storage,
(d) the prohibitron of anti-personnel mines,
@ the ratification of mternatronal rnstrumcnts concerning these matters,
3 Develop and rntensif,'for tlus purpose the contacts its Medrterranean Group has begun to make,
4. Promote the negotiation of a stabihS'pact takrng ur the Medrterranean reglon as a uhole.
5 Propose to that end and ur a first phase:
(a) confidence- and transparency-building measures whose apphcatron u'ould be voluntary,
(b) the notrficatron of manoeuvres,
@ an exchange of rnformation on the military forces deploved and the armaments held,
(d) thc adoption of measures to prevent armed conflrct,
6. Specif_v and pubhcise those mrssions that are hkell'to be entrusted to WEUdependent forces rn the
Medrterranean regron so as to reassure the southem Medrterranean countnes as to an1'use that nught be made
ofthem;
7. Support the efforts of the Council of Europe to hclp the people of Cyprus find a solutron to ther
problems and secure the reuruficatron of Cyprus in pursuance of the London and Zunch Agreements,
8. Seek. possibll'xithrn NATO, to act m concert wrth the Uruted States urth a vierv to promotrng
(a) dralogue and consultation betrveen Greece and Turkev for the purpose of enabhng the
treaties in force to be applied satisfactorily',
@ the end of the blockade on Iraq as soon as there rs evrdence that the Umted Nations
resolutions conceming that countrl'have been apphcd.
@ the rapid and full apphcation of the 1995 agreements betu'een Israel and the Palestinian
Authorrty,
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(d) the guarantee in the medium term of comphance rvrth the Da.lton Accords in Bosnra and
Herzegovma and of respect for the peaceful co-exrstence of the communities of that state,
9. Accommodate Turkcyrs participation rn WEU forces ur the Medrtenanean r,r,rth a \.le\\,to prepanng for
its accession ur the near futurc to WEU and, in due course, to the European Union;
10. Seek to establish lastrng agreements and cooperatron betvr-een WEU and the countnes on the southem
shore of the Mediterranean.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted b1' Mr de Lipkotski, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
l. A sccuntv analvsrs of the cntlrc
Mediterrancan basm mrght seem an extremclv
ambitrous cxerclse owmg to thc vastness of the
geographrc area in question, the diverse and
complex nature of the problcms ansmg there and
the large number of countncs rnl'olved. each rvith
rts o\\n specrfic charactcnstrcs. Grvcn thc
rcpercusslons on the srtuatron in the Medr-
terrancan of the cnses and conflrcts that could
brcak out in regrons bordering upon the area.
examples of thesc bcing the Gulf, the conflrct
affectrng the Kurd populatrons and the one ln
former Yugoslavia. thcv cannot be excludcd from
the present analvsrs Equallr'. although the
problems that ansc m thc areas north. south. east
and rvest of thc Medrterranean drffcr. therr manl'
mterrelated aspects rvould seem to rndrcate the
need for a comprchcnsive anall'sis
2. Thcre rs no doubt u'hatsocvcr that the
political srtuatron on the southern flank of
Europe. u'hrch u'as relegated to the sidehnes
during the cold rvar pcnod on account of East-
West confrontation lvhich had central Europc as
tts maln thcatre, has become increasmglv
important since the end of the East-West drvrde.
The second Gulf War. the conflict in former
Yugoslavra and therr rmpact on the Islamic
n'orld. have undoubtedly, had an mflucnce hcre
But rlhat other factors arc contnbutrng to the
sharp mcrease rn mtcrest on the part of both
Europc and North Amenca in del'elopments in
thc Mediterranean rcglon, as compared rvith
preceding decades') Are the nsks to peace,
stabrlrty and secunty rn the regron no\\. thought
to be greater or ls there more au'areness than
previously' of opportumtres for cooperation and
partnershrp bctu'een Europe and the
Mediterrancan and the advantages they' could
bringr
3. The purpose of thrs report, whrch urll
attempt to answer thesc qucstrons, rs to rdentrfl'
the rangc of polrtrcal problems the region
presents. as they relate to the security of Europe
and the non-European countrres along the shores
of the Mcditerranean It rvrll then be necessan'to
consrder appropriatc ways ln rvhich thel' mrght
bc resoh'ed and the prospects for estabhshrng a
s)'stem of securrh' and stability' acceptablc to the
cntire regron
4 In thrs connectron. tu'o tlpes of rssue can
be distrnguishcd. The first rclates to Euro-
Mediterranean rclations gencralll- and therr
development to the north. south, east and x'cst
Yet confining our studl' to a dcscription of such
problems, horvel'er rmportant in themseh'cs.
carries a nsk of becomrng cnmcshed in gencral.
theoretrcal consideratrons that are unhkelv to lead
to specrfic. practrcal recommendatrons. as the
gro\\'lng number of scminars and colloqures on
Medrterranean lssucs organrsed by specrahst
mstrtutrons sen'cs to rllustrate.
5 It ls necessan'therefore to start b1'prnnrng
doun the flashpoints for partrcular crises and
conflrcts m order to determme rvhether therr
rcsolutron requlrcs specific responses or inputs or
u'hether the problcms raised can bc dcalt urth in
a more general frameu-ork On the results of
such an anall'srs, taking rn both general and
specrfic factors. u'ill depend the role that Europe.
and ccrtarn rnternational organisations, can and
should plav rn the regron and the form that therr
involvement rn the Medrtcrranean should take
6 It rs important to bcar rn mind that thcre rs
not 
.lust one Medficrrancan. Attrtudes rn the
eastcrn Medrterranean arc ver1, different from
thosc rn the rvestern Mcdrterranean rvhcrc thev
are far more akin to European-held vreu's.
7 WEU, for rts part, has not been idle. In
the Petersberg Declaratron of 19 June 1992. the
Councrl of Mrnisters entrusted WEU rirth the
task of estabhshing a gradual and phased
dialogue urth the Maghreb countries. This
dralogue began rrrth Algerra. Morocco and
Tunisra and graduallv extcndcd to Eglpt,
Mauritarua and Israel. The marn purpose of the
meetings rvrth these countncs, rvhich \\'crc
organised through the intcrmcdran' of thcrr
embassrcs ln Brusscls. was to conduct an
exchangc of vreu's on dcl'clopments rn securitv
and defence issues aflecting the Medrterranean
reglon. urth a vieu'to cstabhshing transparencv
and bolsterrng confidence on both sides It has to
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be sard that given that WEU has not become
mvoh'ed rn the polrtrcal aspects, the limrted
dralogue on rvhich it has embarked rvrth these
countncs has not produced anv tangiblc results
and is grvcn a different rcccption dependrng on
the vierrpornt of rndruduai statcs - some. such as
Morocco. s'clcome rt u'hereas others, such as
Eglpt and Turkel'. are disapporntcd bv it.
8 It rs drfficult to produce an exhaustive list
of the rnrtiativcs taken bv varrous partrcs to try to
address the problem of cooperatron ln the
Mediterranean area They' have gcneralll- been
unsuccessful rn overcommg the polrtrcal
problems that have plagued thc rntcrnational
sccnc both in the Maghreb and in thc Mashreq
Thus. the irutratrve taken b1, Francc rn 1985 to
group thc countrres on both shores ofthe rvestern
Mcdrterranean. the "Frve plus Frve", came to
nothrng because of thc Lrbyan issue and the
Algcrran cnsrs Thc countries particlpatrng in
the Fontm 
-for Dralogue and Cooperafion tn the
Medrterranean. rvhich rvas inrtrated bv Egvpt rn
1994.are Algerra. Eglpt. Itah'. Malta. Morocco.
Portugal, Sparn. Tunrsia and Turker'. It was sct
up to cstabhsh polrtrcal, economic and socral
cooperation and promote mternahonal dialogue
among the partrcrpant countncs It can be
regarded as a uscful body' for such dialogue.
u'hrch should dcvclop ln a more structured u'a1'.
In contrast. Amencan initiatrves such as the 1993
Donors' Conference and the Economtc Sttmmtt
Meetrngs at Casablanca in 1994 and Amman m
1995 xere consrdcred by many particrpants to be
too closely associated with Unrted Statcs poho'
9 In this contcxt rt rs also important to take
account of the inrtratrvcs takcn b1' thc CSCE,
nou' the OSCE. u'hosc Committee of Scnror
Offrcrals decrded ln March 1994 to cxtend
rcgular invrtations to Algeria. Egtpt. Isracl.
Morocco and Tunrsra to attend mrnistcnal
meetings held ln the framex'ork of thc
conferences on the organrsatron's reform. A feu'
'n'ears earher. in 1990. Italy and Sparn had
launched a pro1ect to set up a Conference on
Securrty' and Cooperatron rn the Medrterranean
(CSCM). Thrs rnitiative \\'as taken up b1' thc
Interparliamcntan' Union u'rth a vreu' to giving
the parliaments of 21 Medrterranean coastal
statesr a central role rn the process, u'hich also
I Albania, Algcna. Bosnra and Herzegovina.
Croatia. Cyprus, Eglpt. the Formcr Yugoslav
Repubhc of Macedonra. France. Greece. Isracl. Itall'.
invoh'cs the parhaments of the United States. the
Unitcd Krngdom and Russra as r,vell as seven
mternattonal parliamentary' assemblies. rncludrng
that of WEU. The most valuable feature of thrs
endeavour rs that rt bnngs together all thc
Mediterranean partners. rncludrng Israel and thc
Palestinians. on an equal footrng pending the
creatron of rntergovernmental instrtutrons.
l0 After tuo plcnary confercncos. rn Malaga
rn 1992 and La Valette rn 1995. the Inter-
parhamentan' Unron is prepanng to hold thc
third one 
- 
nhrch xrll concentrate on the CSCM
- 
m Tunis rn 1999. bv organisrng thematic
mcctmgs, lvith the ncxt onc due to takc place rn
Monaco on 3 and 4 Juh, 1997 Aftcr thc pattern
of thc CSCE. the CSCM. rn its capacrtv as an
intcrparhamentary bodl'. has defined threo arcas
on u'hich to focus rts uork
ft) polrtical coopcrahon on securitv
regional stabilrtl'.
(ii) cconomlc cooperatlon co-develop-
mcnt and partncrshrp.
(rtt) dtalogu.e betrveen crvrhsations and
human rights.
In vrerv of this chorce. 1'our Rapporteur can onlv
hopc that the WEU Assembll' u'ill contmue to
plal'an actil'e part rn this process, particularll'as
rcgards the first of the three areas. u'hich tres rn
closcly' ivrth WEU's rcsponsrbilrtres
I I A purel-v- parliamcntar)' organlsatron such
as thc Interparliamcntan' Unron cannot of course
be expected to drau' up agreements commrttmg
governments. Its competcnce, moreover, rs based
on thc authontl' vestcd ln the natronal
parhamcnts of indrvrdual countries 
- 
thrs
obvrously vanes from one countn'to another and
is not thc samc north and south of thc
Mediterranean Yet the fact that elected membcrs
of parhamcnt representrng all the peoples of thc
Mediterranean region have succceded in reaching
agreement on thc prrnciples on u'hich a lastrng
peacc in that rcgron can be burlt is no mean feat
and grves grounds to hope that the parhaments
rrrll brrng all thcrr u'erght to bear on efforts to
Jordan, Lebanon, Lrbva. Malta, Monaco. Morocco,
Portugal. Slovenra. Sparn. S-v"na. Tunrsra, Turker'.
Yugoslavia and the Palcstrnran Authorrtv as an
assocrate particlpant
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orgamse a new order ofpeace, and that the peoples'
rcpresentatives have foreshadow'ed agreement
among their govemments and opened up new
avenues. Support from the urtemational commurutl'
cannot but increase respect for parliamentarl'
rrstrtutions ur the Medrterranean countnes and at
the same trme xrll spur on the quest for a just and
lasting pcace throughout the regron.
12. In the field of securitr', the endeavours NATO
has been makrng surce December 1994 to establish
a dralogue u'ith six southem Medrterranean
countnesr. have not actueved the objective of a
parftrers]up for peace rn the Medrterranean, rvhile it
would appear that contacts made u'rth certaur
countnes by,the WEU Medterranean Group have
not conlrnced the partrcrpants and are currenth' at a
standstill. It is probably these unsuccessful
attempts that led the European Union to address the
Medrterranean problem as a lvhole at the Barcelona
Conference.
13 On27 and 28 November 1995. the European
Union orgarused a Euro-Mediterranean Conference
ur Barcelona attended by 27 countnes: the 15
member states of the European Uruon and 12
countnes from the southern shore of the
Medrterranean, namelr'. Algena. C1prus, Eglpt,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta. Morocco, S1na,
Tumsn. Turkel,and the Palestrruan Authon[' The
maur ob;ectrve of the Conference was to define thc
essentral elements of a very rvide-rangrng Euro-
Medrterranean polrtrcal. economic, social and
cultural parffrershrp. Nerther Libva (because of the
embargo rmposed on rt by' the mtematronal
commuruty m response to its stance on terronsm)
nor the countries of former Yugoslar.ra lrere inr..rted
to the Conference Although the Uruted States
attcnded as an observcr onll'. it had put ven' strong
prcssure on the Europeans to garn admrt[ance as a
participant. It vvas granted obsen'er status only,and
agreed to lt on the understandrng that the
Conference u'ould not cover conflrcts ufuch had not
been resolved. particularll, the one in the Middle
East. It became perfectly clear ur tlus context that
the United States drd not u'ant to lose its monopoly
in the negotiations on the Mrddle East peace
process. Furthermore, f the Uruted States had been
admrttcd to the Conference as a partrcipant. it is
probable that Russia rvould have requested the same
status
2 Eg1pt. Israel, Jordan,
Tunrsra.
14 The Barcelona Conference agreed on the
followrng three mam aspects for a Euro-
Medrterranean partnerstup.
a political and secunq, parfirershrp;
an economic and financial partrrerstup
urth particular emphasrs on the
progressive establishment of a free-trade
area, and financial assstanc€ ur the form
of appropnations amountrng to some 4.7
mrlhon ecus for the period 1995-99
a partrrerstup rn socnl. cultural and
human affars wrth a lleu'to promoturg
understandurg betrveen cultures and
exchanges between cilrl societies
Tlus rs the most ambrtious project ever undertaken
by Europe to help non-European Mediterranean
countries by adoptmg an overall approach that
should contnbute to secuntl'rn the regron
15 It should be stressed that there has been a
malor development m the Arab nations over the last
decade After beurg tempted for too long by a
srmplistrc rnterpretation of contemporan' realrt_v,
seeing thereur an ertensron of the "colonial pact",
and harrng considered themselves to be the victrms
of sheer explortatron bv intematronal caprtalists
pleased at findrng lorv-priced raw matenals rn the
Arab countnes, the latter are becomrng increasrngly
senstive to the need to join a rvorldwrde econorruc
order uhrch puts the proper value on their
nuurpo\ er and the fruits of rts labour rvlule at the
same trme rnvesting consrderable caprtal rn the
neccssan'equipment Ttus change rs leadrng them
to nen'Europe in a nerv and mfirutely more realmtrc
lght and they nolv see t as an essential partrrer ur
relation to their ne$' acceptance of a rvorldwrde
economic order. In thrs context. an elent such as
the Barcelona Conference takes on all its
srgruficance because it represents not only Europe's
response to Arab aspratrons but also the opening of
a dialogue, the development of exchanges and the
pronuse of ard of a ll'holl1, drfferent nature from an1,
assistance afforded lvhen relatrons \\'ere on a
colorual footing
16. Thrs does not mean that the southem
Medrterranean countnes are satrsfied wrth the
Barcelona outcome. Your Rapporteur heard a great
deal of cnticism of it rrr Turker', S1na, Eglpt and





the relatively modest ef[ects of the
financial package. r e the fact that the
transfers of funds do not realh, reflect
the stated objectrves. While rt ls
necessary to listen to the criticism
voiced. it does not invalidate the
endeavour as a rvhole. Indeed, it has
been grven a very favourable receptron
b1, countries that rvish to become part
of the world economy but at their own
pace and according to policres that suit
therr ou,n national charactcristics, so
that thev can remain in control of their
orrm destrrues-
- 
the Moroccan Prime Minister did not
mincc his words x,hen he expressed
regret that no progress had been madc
ln an)' area since the Barcelona
Conference: the meetings of experts
had not produced anlthing and he was
intending to complain about this at the
meeting planned for April 1997. its
specific purposc being to take stock of
follow-up actron since the Confercnce.
17. Barcelona is not a Euro-Arab event but
rather an attempt to establish a nelv ordcr for the
Mediterranean region as a whole A country
such as Israel has everything to gain from the
resolve expressed at the Conference being given
practical effect, not only because the transfor-
mation of neighbouring countries constitutes the
prime conditron for marntaining peace in the
region and, consequently, for rts long-term
secunty, but also because lts economic and
internal socral balance, and therefore the
independence of rts foreign policl', can clearly
only benefit from such a transformation if short-
term political rmtiatives do not jeopardise the
peace process that began following the Oslo
Accords.
18 With regard to security aspects proper,
one of the undertakrngs given in the Barcelona
Declaration by the participants m the Conference
was to
"consider any confidence- and secun6-
building mezxures that could be taken
behveen the parties u-ith a uew to the
creation of an area of peace and stabilrty in
the Medrterranean, mcludrng the long-term
possibilrty of establishing a Euro-Medrter-
rumean pact to tlnt end".
l9 Thrs rnrtiative is obvrousll' of interest to
WEU but it rvas not rnvited to attend thc
Conference or be mvolved in anv European
Union action to be taken on the Barcelona
Declaratron ln respect of security ln the
Medrterranean. Thought therefore necds to be
glven to wa)'s of harmonrsing the various
rnrtiatives of internatronal organrsations The
Atlantic Alliance for rts part launched an
initrative on the Medrterranean rn December
1994 rvith a vierv to estabhshing a dialogue lvith
such countnes as Eglpt, Isracl, Jordan,
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, although there
is as yet no clear consensus on the content or
ultimate aim of this rnrtratrve3. It should be noted
in passing that NATO drd not invrte Algeria to
take part rn the dialogue.
20. Desprte the fact that WEU has achrevcd
little in its dialogue rvrth the southern
Mediterranean countries, the WEU Ministers, at
the close of therr Birmrngham meetmg on 7 Mav
1996, strcssed the rmportance of better
coordinatron of the European Union's and
NATO's Mediterranean initiatives rvith WEU's.
takrng into account the results of the Euro-
Medrterranean Conference m Barcelona. They
tasked the Permanent Councrl to reflcct further
on measures to improve the content of the
dralogue and, at therr next Ministerral Council
meetmg to be held in Ostend on 19 November, to
report progress on such reflection, particularly
with a view to the Conference to be organised by
the European Uruon rn the first half of 1997 as
part of the Barcelona follow-on process. But anv
decision on appropriate models for establishrng
an area of peace. stability and security in the
Medrterranean depends on a pnor analysis of the
nature of the problems affecting regional
security.
II. Assessment of the situution throughout the
Mediterranean
2l The situation rs charactensed by a number
of rvidely-varying regional conflrcts on top of
general problems affecting the Medrterranean as
a lvhole.
3 See Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee and
Ian O. Lesser: Mediterranean security: new
challenges. nerv tasks, NATO revtew, May 1996.
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A. Regional conflicts affeaing security in the
Mediterranean
l. Developments in the Middle East peace process
22 Among the conflrcts that contmuc to cause
havoc throughout the Mcdrtcrranean regron as a
u'holc. but ri'hich have imphcations that go far
be1'ond it, developmcnts rn the proccss for
estabhshing peace bctuccn Israel and the Arab
countrres are of thc utmost tmportance,
especrallr rn the rlakc of the parltamentan-
elections held on 29 Ma1' 1996. Most observers
regard thc ncu' pohcres bcing folloived b1' thc
governmcnt of Mr Netanlahu - 
"rho u'as electedPrrme Mirustcr b1' unrversal suffrage beatrng hrs
predecessor. Shrmon Peres. b1' a very small
ma.lontr- 
- 
as a threat to thc peace process
Various factors have brought rt to a virtual
standstill the neu' government's declaration that
Israel's vital securrtv rnterests comc before peace
and rts negatron of the princrple of an exchangc
of thc occupred tcrntones for peacc 
- 
coupled
urth a resumptlon of rts dehberatc pohcy' of
estabhshrng Jesrsh scttlements ln those
terntorles 
- 
rts refusal to rvithdrau' Israeli troops
from Hebron, the fact that Mr Nctanvahu's
mcetrng urth Mr Arafat produced nothrng. and.
lastlr,. thc opening of thc tunnel beneath thc al-
Aqsa mosque. Tensron bctu'cen Israel and Sy'rra
in partrcular rose to such a point that tn
Septembcr 1996. Svrra mcreased troop
movements rn Lebanon and moved closer to the
Golan Herghts
23. In thrs context rt rs rmportant to remember
that negotratrons betrveen S1'na and Israel. in
partrcular as rcgards the terms of an Israeh
urthdrau'al from the Golan Herghts and southern
Lebanon (rn rcturn for drsarmament of the
Hrzbollah Shirte mrlrtra). had progresscd to such
an extent b1,' the start of 1996 that some
obscrvers hopcd that a peace settlement betu'cen
the trr'o countnes u'ould only' be a matter of
trmea But after Mr Rabm's assassrnatron.
Mr Pcrcs requested a freeze rn the negotratrons
untrl hc could secure an endorsement of hrs pcace
pohcy through earlv electrons The rgsult u'as a
defeat for the Labour-lcd malontv and the return
to po\\er of the Lrkud
1. Internattonal l{erald Trrbune. l5 Januarv 1996.
Le Ftgaro.2:l January' 1996. The F-tnancral Ttrnes.2
February 1996
21 Untrl the begrnnrng of the )'ear.
consrderable progrcss had also bcen made
tou,ards settlemcnt of the Israeh-Palestmtan
conflrct follox'rng the conclusron of thc Oslo
Accords on the status of thc Palcstinran
tgrntorres and relatrons betu'een Israel and the
Palestrnran Authoritl' Follo*'ing the Palestrnian
electrons rn Januarl' 1996. thc PLO organrsed a
mectrng m Mav of thc Palcstmran Natronal
Councrl. rvhrch deleted thc artrclc in its natronal
charter calhng for the destructron of the Statc of
Israel In response. the govcrnmcnt of Shrmon
Peres declarcd that Israel uould no longer opposc
the creatron of a Palestrruan State Frnallr'. the
Palestrnran Authorrtv set up a Palcstrnian pohcc
force m its terntorr,' u'hrch provcd cffectrve m
preventrng the contrnuatron of acts of terrorrsm
Srnce the Israeh electron. meetrngs betrveen
Mr Netanl'ahu and Mr Arafat have made no
progress and Isracli rrutiatrves have resulted rn a
questron mark hangrng over the contrnued rmple-
mcntatron of the provision of the Oslo Accords
25 ln the rvake of reneu'ed vrolent clashes
bctu'ecn Palestrnians and Israelis follou'rng the
opcnlng of a neu' access gatc to a tunnel running
under east Jerusalem. s'hrch resulted rn the death
of ovcr 75 people u'rth a further 400 or so
m.;urcd. thcre is a case for askrng *hether hopcs
for a resumptlon of the peace process have not
been dashed But consrderatron must be grvcn
among other thrngs to thc fact that public oprnron
m Israel rs drvrded and that almost half the Israelr
population opted for peacc bascd on a com-
promrse betu'cen Palestrnran asprrations and
Israel's legrtrmatc securitv conccrns In addrtron.
the Israeh Govcrnment rs sublect to constant
pressure both u'rthrn the countrl' and from the
Unrted States. Thc fact that President Clinton
convened a mectlng betu'een Mr Netanvahu and
Mr Arafat in Washrngton rmplies that the US
Govcrnmcnt urll do lts utmost to prevent a total
brcakdoun of the peace process. It rs true that
the Presrdent's hands \\'cre some\rhat tied rn the
run-up to the prcsrdcntral elections. It is also to
be hopcd that the Israeli Government docs not
ignorc the posrtron of thc Arab countrres. among
u'hrch Eglpt in partrcular acts as an arbrtcr. It
has to be rn the mterest of Israel. u'hich uas
begrnning to emerge from rts rsolatron vrs-a-vis
the Arab uorld- 
-13 Arab heads of state attended
Mr Rabin's funeral 
- 
not to lct its relations urth
lts Arab ncrghbours deterrorate an]' further
There rvas ncvcr anv sensc. and certainlv no
future, rn thc exlstence of Israel as a fortress
10
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constanth'under siege and rely'rng for rts sccuritl,
solelv on rts militarl' superioritv lvhen no-one
knorvs ho*, long that will last. as Mr Netanvahu's
predeccssors \\'ere lvell au'are Thev opened up
promisrng prospects for Israel's economlc
cooperatron urth neighbouring countries, thrs
berng a far bctter guarantee of lasting securitv
because rt u'ould mvolve all the region's
rnhabrtants.
26. A freczc rn thc peace process therefore has
to be reckoned urth for some trme. But u,ith
rencu'ed Palestrnran vrolence in the occupied
terntones giung nse to serious concem, the
questron is: hou' long can the freczc go on
lvrthout provokrng a dangerous cscalatron of
tension in the regron'/
27 As far as Europe rs concerned, rt is clear
that rts polrtrcal stabrlrty and secunty depend on
the parallel situation rn thc Mediterranean basm
Hou'ever. there can bc no guarantee of such
stabrlrtl' and secuntv there u'rthout a 
.1ust and
stable pcacc rn the Mrddle East In thrs respect.
relations betu'een Israel and the Palestintans are
a kev rssue that could dccrdc the future of the
overall peacc process m the Mrddle East.
28. The futurc of that proccss rs currentlv
shrouded in uncertarntl', partrcularlv as regards
comphance rvrth the agrccmcnts already
concluded and anr' futurc progress.
29 To salvage the peace process, both parties
must honour all the commitments rnto u'hrch thev
frecly cntered 
- 
thrs mcludes the trmetable set bv
the agrcements 
- 
and must also take them as a
basis for making furthcr progress. Compliance
urth the agreements mcans that Israel must
contrnue to redeplov rts forces, ll'hrch also
imphes rvrthdrawmg them from the Hebron
region Your Rapporteur is u,ell a\yare of the
extent of Israel's securitv concerns and for this
reason suggcsts that redeplorment should takc
place on thc basrs of an oblective assessment 
-
clearll' explaincd to the internatronal community
- 
of those concerns and takrng into account
lessons learnt from cooperatlon u-rth the
Palestinian Authorrtl'
30 The Assemblv roundly condemns the acts
of terronsm perpetrated against Israel w'hich
havc rnlured or claimed the lives of manv victims
and have aroused concern among thc Israeli
populatron. Whrle understandmg the senous
secuntv concems of the Israeli Government. it
nonetheless considers that Israel must contrnuc to
redeplol' lts forces m accordance x'rth the
agreemcnts concluded Mr Chrrac's recent lrsrt
to the Middlc East. and in partrcular the outcome
of his talks u'rth Mr Netanvahu. givc grounds to
hope that thrs redeployment rvrll take place soon.
desprte the rncrdents that occurred during thc
French Presrdent's vrsit to East Jcrusalem.
2. Crises involving Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran
31 The srtuatron in the Medrterranean ls
furthcr complicated bv its being influcnccd b-v the
devclopment of other conflicts in surrounding
areas Reforence should be made for instance to
tensions betu'een Turkcl' and S1'na and to the
Kurdish problcm. uhrch rnvolves those countries,
Iran and Iraq u'hose mrlttary actron rn the
northern part of the country in earl1, September
1996 led to rcprisals from thc Amcncans
32. In thrs context it should be noted that thc
reservations expressed b1'the Arab world and by
Europe to thc Unrted States' actron, coupled with
strong crrtrcrsm from Moscorv. could havc
unforesecable consequences in relatron to Iraq.
u'hich now seems to be less polrtrcalll' rsolated
than before. Thcre rvould appear to be an
rncreaslng rrsk in marntairung the economrc
blockade on Iraq
33 Turkish pohcy under Mr Erbakan's
govcrnment is anothcr rmportant factor It rs not
y et possrble to prn it dor,rn grven the conflrctmg
srgnals coming out of tht: countn' Trvo mrhtary
coopcration agreements x'ere srgned, in Fcbruary
and August 1996, betrveen Turkey and Israel,
u'hrch ls a source of concern to S1'rra and the
Arab countncs among others. The agreements
have led some observers to predrct a neu' move
torvards stratcgrc convergence betrveen the
United States. Turkev and Israel, li'hrch might
even mclude Jordan. When questroncd b1,y'our
Rapporteur, the Turkish authorities stronglv
refuted anv such suggestion and plal'ed doun the
scope of the agreements, which the1, mamtarned
\\'cre simrlar to those concludgd u'rth other
countries and rvcrc rntended solell' for defence
purposes. Neverthcless, Sy,na and some Arab
countries are rvorrrcd by this developmcnt. In
addrtron, Turkel' has also srgned a ma1or
agreemcnt rvith Iran on natural gas supplies,
causing deep annol,ance to the United States.
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Ankara has tried to mrnimise its importance,
stressing that Turkey sees rt as no more than a
trade agreement.
34 As for relations between Turkey and
Europe, 1'our Rapporteur's various contacts made
a pomt of telling hrm how much frustration and
disappointment u'as felt as regards the European
Union's attitude to therr countrl'. Turkel,
considered rtsclf to be a lo1'al ally that had made
a consrderable ef[ort during the cold rvar to
protect the southern flank of the Alliance and rt
nolv had the rmpression that it was not reapmg
the rewards. Despite all rts pledges to fully
integrate wrth Europe, it had no prospect of
becoming a member of the European Unron rn
the near future or of recerving support from
Europe to help it solve rts problems.
35. Regarding WEU in partrcular. the Turks
consider their associate-member status to be so
humiliating that the Turkrsh Parliament refused
to authorise thc involvement of Turkish troops tn
a WEU exercise carried out in Portugal. The
Turks do not accept the argument that they have
to belong to the European Union m order to be a
full member of WEU, rvhen thel' are already a
member of NATO. As such, they consider rt
wrong that the security guarantee provrded b1'thc
North Atlanhc Treaty might one day be extended
to new NATO members (from central Europe)
lvhen Turkev is refused the guarantees of the
modified Brussels Treatl' They also object to
havmg been left out of the third phase of Crisex
and fear they will not be allou'ed to particrpate rn
Euromarfor w'hereas Greece, on the other hand.
could be given a role rn it. The Turks are
seekrng a srgruficant gesture that rvould allow
NATO members to become full members of
WEU as well Thrs u'ould onl.v affect Turkey
since Iceland and Norway are content with their
associate-membcr status. In the framervork of
the rntergovernmental conference, Turkey' has
sent a memorandum to the EU member countries
requestmg that there should be no link between
membership of the European Union and
membership of WEU. It rs behevcd that the onll'
favourable response has come from the British
36. Relations between Turkey and the Arab
countnes have alu.ays been sensitive, not least
because of memorres of the Ottoman Empire's
dominron over many of them Furthermore. the
Egyptran Foreign Affairs Mrnrster told )'our
Rapporteur that, in his oprnron, Turkish-Arab
relahons had deterrorated since Turkey signed the
former Baghdad Pact. From then on, according
to the Minister, Turkev had ceased to make
common cause with the Arab countries Ankara
and the Arab rvorld had drax.n a shade closer
followrng Turkey''s commitment to the Bosnian
Mushms in rccent I'ears Holever, certam
issues have created a climate of drstrust and
could lead to tensions. Brlateral problems
between Syrra and Turkey fall rnto this category
Apart from the two countrres' conflicting policres
rvith regard to Israel, Svrra has never abandoned
its claim for Hatay'provlncc to be returned to it
Syria also charges Turkcl' rvrth endangering its
rvater suppll, rvith the senes of dams the latter
has built on the Euphratcs, w'hile Turkev for its
part accuses Syria of harbounng Kurdrsh PKK
terronsts and even of supporting PKK action
against Turkey The severity of these tcnsions,
which placed a strarn on relations bctwcen the
tu'o countries throughout the sumrner of 1996,
led to both ofthem dcplofing troops along their
borders Neverthelcss, the Vice-Presrdent of the
Republic of S,vrra, Mr Khaddam, made a point of
telling I'our Rapporteur that he had no u'ish to
see a serious deterioration in relations between
Syria and Turkey'. Thrs u'as rvhy' President
Assad had decrded to mvrte the new Pnme
Minister. Mr Erbakan. rvho u,as vrerved in a
favourable hght in Syna, to come to Damascus
for a meeting
37. But the coolmg of relations all round
betwecn Turkey and the Arab countries has
become more pronounced as a result of therr fear
of Turkel' establishing a securitv zone in
northern Iraq by statrorung troops there as
protectron agarnst the PKK Assurances from
the Turkish President to President Mubarak to
the effect that Turkel' drd not envisage anv
deployment of its forces on Iraqr terntorv have
not sufficed to date to reassure the Arab
countries, partrcularly Egypt, which has
reaffirmed its resolve to preserve Iraq's terntorial
rntegritt' and sovereignty This hardJine position
rs to be understood in the context of American
punitive stnkes against southern Iraq rn early'
September 1996 follou'rng Iraqi troops' inter-
vention in the crvil rvar being waged betrveen the
Kurdrsh factions rn the north This action on the
part of the Unrted States met with serious
challengc from Eglpt and other Arab countnes.
A new conflict over Iraq rvould therefore carry a
maJor risk. Some Arab countrres might dissociate
themselves from the coalition agamst Iraq
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established during the Gulf War. Such a
development rvould serve onlv to strengthen
Presrdent Saddam Hussein's positron n'hrle
creatmg tension wrth the United States
38. Wrth regard to the Syrian posrtron,
government representatives and in partrcular the
Vice-President of the Republic of Syna,
Mr Khaddam. told 1'our Rapporteur horv much
they apprecrated President Chirac's efforts to
give Europe a rene\\'ed polrtrcal role in the
Middle East Mr Chirac's visit to the Middle
East in October 1996 urll undoubtedly' have
reinforced that appreclatlon The Sl,rian
Government u'ants the European Union, spurred
on b1'the French. to take on more responsibilities
in the region. in partrcular by givrng fresh
impetus to the peace process, so as to
counterbalance Amerrcan influence and exert the
necessary pressure on Israel
39. Besrdes this, the Svrians have some
reseryatrons about the Barcelona process Thel'
fear they u'ill be forced to adopt a European
economic model based on ultra-hberahsm for
rvhich Syna is partrcularly' rll prepared because
of the rvav in u'hich rts economl' has been
nationahsed, a process that has produced mixed
results The Barcelona process does indeed
imply that liberahsrng the Svrran economl is a
prerequlsrte for access to funds and accompany-
mg financral packages Accordrng to the Syrian
Governmcnt, thc problem necds to be tackled the
other lvav round no\\' rs thc trme to help the
S1'rian economl- adapt to a frcc market. On the
subject of the peace process, Mr Khaddam w'as
extremelv cntrcal of Mr Arafat. pornting out that
he had received nothing in return for all the
concesslons he had made. Refernng to the Golan
Heights, the Vice-President said an agreement
rvrth Israel had been on the horizon rn n'hrch the
State of Israel u'ould have agreed a return to the
4 June 1967 hne. Norv. the ilhole peace process
lras blocked. Mr Khaddam \\'as ven' guarded
when speaking about Mr Netanvahu and sard
things rvould have to rvait until Mr Chnton uas
re-elected Presrdent of the Unrted States before
there could be an1' hope of a change in Israeh
policy.
3. Crises between countries in North Africa
40. Among other cnsrs flashpoints to be bome
in mind as likel1,to have an rmpact on secuntl'rn
the Mediterranean is the contmumg tcnsion
betlveen Egypt and Sudan 
- 
Eglpt depends on
the latter for 80% of its rvater supplv
Furthermore, Eglpt has on several occaslons
accused Sudan of provrdrng trammg (partrcularlv
mrlrtary training) for Egyptian Islamist groups.
notabll, in connection with the attempt to
assassinate President Mubarak at the
Organisatron of Afrrcan Unrtr, (OAU) summit
meeting in Addis Ababa rn June 1995. Political
instabilrtv in Libya could have repercussions on
Eglpt, rvhich is faced u'ith the problem of its
relations rvith Coloncl Gaddafi, rvho is intent on
seekrng a spccral rclatronshrp with Eglpt to
counter his countn"s rsolation from the
internatronal communrtv.
4l The Polrtrcal Committee's visit to Morocco
from 27 -29 October 1996 gave it an opportunrty'
to put together some extremely interesting
informatron on developments in the Maghreb
and, in particular. on the posrtion of Morocco
rtself Thc Committee was partrcularh' satrsfied
to see that the Moroccan authorrtrcs rvhole-
heartedly support the political and securrtv
dimensron of the Euro-Medrterranean partnership
envrsaged b1, the Barcelona Conference, u'hich
mrght eventually lead to the rmplementatron of a
Euro-Mediterranean pact.
42. As mentroned rn Chapter III of thrs report,
thc Moroccans \\.crc much more receptrve to the
dialogue WEU has bcgun urth the Maghreb
countries than rvcrc erthcr Egypt or Turkey.
Thel'had no objection to the creation of Eurofor
and Euromarfor and rvelcomed the fact that
Morocco had been mvrted to send observers to
rvatch exerclses carned out by those forces The
general lmpresslon u,as that the situation \!'as
assessed very differentll, dependmg on u'hether
countries la)' to the rvcst or east of the
Medrterranean.
43. As regards relations betn'een the Maghreb
countrres. it rvould seem that the Algerran
problem and drfferences betrveen Morocco and
Algerra are obstacles to the harmonious
development of real cooperation betrveen
Morocco. Tunrsra and Algeria u,hich rvould
enable the thrce countries to form a coherent
economic and politrcal partnership.
44. Yet no progress has been made on finding
a solution to the drspute over the westem Sahara,
rvhrch has been going on for years betrveen
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Morocco and Algeria Algerra rs accused of
continuing to support the Pohsarro Front and of
not showing any rvrllmgness to settle thc
problem. Morocco has agreed to the plan draun
up by the United Natrons. rvhich, among other
things, makes provision for a referendum on self-
determinatron for thc wcstcrn Saharan people.
As the referendum has been postponed several
times, Morocco has frozcn its relations rvith
Algeria
45 Furthermorc. in vicu' of the internal
srtuatron rn Algena rvhere outright crvil rvar is
being rvaged on extreme fundamentahst move-
ments such as the GIA (Armed Islamic Group),
therc is lrttle hope at present of an,v political
cooperatron betu,een Algeria and its tu'o
neighbours, thel' being more concerned about
protectrng their socretres from infiltratron by
Algerran Islamrst movements than about
establishing close tres u'rth the regrmc rn Algrers
46. The members of the Polrtrcal Commrttee
asked their Moroccan contacts to rvhat extent
the,v thought WEU could hclp solve the problem
and, more generally, u'hether the first part of the
Barcelona process for the peaceful settlement of
conflrcts could not bc uscd in thrs connection
Thev u,ere told that neither WEU nor the
Barcelona process could rntervene to plal' a
mediating rolc rn the matter. The Moroccans
more or less gave the impressron that they rlere
counting on some sort of international pressure
that lvould force Algerra to enter into senous
negotiatrons rvrth rts nerghbours.
47. For the time being. Moroccan parliament-
arians and members of the Polrtrcal Committcc
agree in their thinking that the example of
strengthened economic and polrtical cooperatron
rvith Morocco and Tunisra could persuade
Algeria to embark on a process leadrng to
democracy and reform, lvhrch uould quah!, it to
jorn the ranks of those countnes able to enjol'
genume coopcration wrth Europe
48 In thrs respect Morocco sets a verJ'
posrtive example on account of the progress it
has made torvards a sy'stem of political pluralism
and a democratic Constrtutron, and because of rts
efforts to rmprove rts human rights record
49. As for Tumsia. rt deserves special mention
for its economrc reforms and has rightfully won
recognitron from the IMF and the World Bank in
thrs connectron. Its economic groulh rate
corroborates thrs ven' significant devclopment
Tunisia's economic boom has protected rt from
the advance of Islamism. although rt strll has
some rvav to go as far as rts democratic
rnstrtutrons are concerncd.
50 Partnershrp u'ith Europc must not be
allos-ed to echpse the importance of inter-Arab
relatrons It rs. for instance. drsappointrng that.
after a promrsmg start. the UMA (Umon of Arab
Maghreb countries. comprlsmg Morocco,
Algcna. Tunrsra. Lrby-a and Mauritania) has norv
rcachcd stalcmate In additron to the problems
of the w'estem Sahara and the Polisarro Front.
there is also the embargo agamst Lrbva that u'as
rmposed by'the United Natrons follorvrng Lrby'an
attacks on American and French arrcraft
5 l. Nevertheless. despite thrs perrod of rnertra.
Morocco and Tunisia as partners contrnue to set
great store b1' the gurdrng rdeas bchrnd both thc
UMA and. even more so. the Maghreb Europe
can but regret that thc current srtuatron has led to
the suspension of the "Five plus Frve" dralogue
The Commrttee's gencral impressron *'as that rts
Moroccan contacts took the vrerv that stabrlitf in
the Mediterranean depended first and foremost
on the solution of economrc and social problems.
1. Cy-prus and disputes befit:een
Greece and Turkey
52 Among the interstate conflrcts affectrng
securitl'rn the Medrterranean, tu'o specrfic criscs
should be mentroned: the first concerns Cy'prus,
and the second the problems betu'een Greecc and
Turkey in the Aegean Sea These drffer sharpll'
from the problems referred to above rn that
European countrres are drrectlv mvolved.
53. The Cyprus problem. because of the
prospect of the Clprrot state's accesslon to the
European Union, rs a scnsrtivc lssue 
- 
rn the
same \\'a)' as is thc drspute betrveen Greece and
Turkel' 
- 
because rt mvolves trvo members of the
Atlantrc Alhance The negotratrons, scheduled to
start ln the srx-month penod following the
conclusron of the mtergovemmental conference,
to prepare for Cvprus's accession to the
European Union threaten to give rise to serious
conflrct betu,een the European Union and
Turkel', and perhaps also betrveen the EU and
Greece, if rt proves rmpossible to agree on
14
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arrangcments acceptable to all the nterested partles
for tlus statc's entn'to the European Union It is not
rnmedratelv obvrous at present of u'hat such
arrangemcnts nught consrst.
54. Hou'ever lt ls no secret that other long-
standrng drffcrcnccs drvrde Turkey and Grcccc, for
example over the Aegean Sea. rvestem Thrace. etc.,
m relatron to uhrch nefiher the European Uruon nor
WEU are orgarusailons surted to act as rmpartial
medrators. rf onlv because one pag'to thc conflict,
Grcece. rs a full member of both orgarusatrons.
ufule the other. Turke)', rs not a member of the
European Uruon and has onll' associate-member
status rr WEU. not hanng been in"rted to accede to
the modrficd Brussels Trea['. Some mcmbers of
the Commrttee expressed the lrerv that the Councrl
of Europc \\'as an appropnatc forum rr which thrs
problem should be drscusscd Hou'c'"'cr, not all of
them agreed The Assemblv can do no more than
note the urformatron rt rccervcd. accordrng to lvhrch
thc WEU Councrl. at the trmc of Grcecc's acccsslon.
formalll' dechned to deal urth thrs matter Thc
Asscmbll' camot. therefore. request rt to rcvokc its
dccrsron n'hrch. m !'lc\\' of the crrcumstanccs. *'ould
appear to be sound Dururg lls nsrt to Turkey,
vour Rapporteur was told of deep-rooted oppositron
m the countn' to the accesslon of the state of
C1prus, as rt currentlv exsts. to the European
Uruon. Anr- such move u'ould bnng together trvo
states urth Greek populatrons and ),our
Rapporteur's Turkrsh contacts said ttus u'ould make
anv agreement betseen the Uruon and Turkey'
rmpossrble It u'ould therefore seem necessary to
find a solutron to the Clprus problem that is
acceptable to the tivo commuruties on the island and
to the states that are guarantors under the London
and Zunch Agrcements. before enr.rsagrng the
acccsslon of a Clpnot state. xhrch rn rcalit_v
controls onlv part of the rsland. to a European
Uruon clarmrng to have a corrrmon forergn and
secunh'pohcv
5. Ihe impact of the conflict in the llalkans
o n E u r r>Me diterra n ean r elation s
55. A lasturg accommodatron betueen Greece
and Turkev rs all the more desrable given that
contmuatron of the drspute could undermine the
credrbrlrtv of the rmtrative Europe took rn Barcelona
uith a uerv to contnbutrng to the formation of areas
of peace and stabrlitf in the region of the
Medrterranean subject to tensron. For the non-
European countnes of the Mediterranean, Europe's
credbrlrt_v has alreadv been erodcd bv its rrabrlrtv to
avoid an outbreak of lvar m former Yugoslar,ra and
put an cnd to rt urthout thc Umted Statcs havrng to
rntcn'cnc Houcvcr. uhlc thc repcrcusslons of thc
conflrct on Euro-Medrterrzmeiur relatrons carr)'
nsks. thcy' also offer srgrrs of hope. The nsks stcm
from the drstrust the Islamrc countries have of
Europcans uhom thel' suspect of not havrng done
enough to support the cause of the Bosruan
Mushms The hopeful srgns. on the other hand. lie
rn the partrclpatlon of mrlrtary forces fiom some
fuab countnes of the Medrterranean regron in
efforts by the Uruted Nations and NATO to restore
peace rn Bosrua and ur the rmplementatron of the
Dalton Accords The Eglptran Mrruster for
Forergn Affarrs told 1'our Rapporteur that the
participation of troops from Arab countries such as
Eglpt m the peacckeeping forces m former
Yugoslavia could scn'e as a model for Euro-
Mcdrtcrrancan coopcration m crisrs-management
srtuatrons m other regons and pave thc u'ay for
cooperatron ur other areas
56. But rdentrfirng the mam cnss flashpornts
hkelv to affect secunh' m thc Mcdrtcrrancan basrn is
onh' onc factor ur analy'srng the srtuatron in the
region smce lt rs equalll' affected by the exstence of
problems of a more general nature u'hrch must also
be taken rnto consrdcratron before formulating ideas
as to hou'to meet prcsent and future challenges
B. General problems in
E u r uM editerr on e an r elatio n s
1. The repercussions of economic,
social and demographic change
on E u ro-M e dilet an ean r e lations
57 Thc drfference ln terms of economic
development bchreen thc northem and southcm
Mcdrtcrranean rs an rmportant factor to be bome in
mrnd Thc area to the north rs largely' made up of
prospcrous, hrghlv developed European countries
urutcd ur thc European Uruon common markct and
bound by' mrlrtary alhances such as NATO and
WEU
58 tn contrast. the stuatron to the south,
particularly' in economrc terms, is more uneven.
There is clearlv a urde gap betiveen countnes u'hich
export natural resources, such as the Gulf states,
Lrb1,a and Algena. and the other southern
Medrterranean Arab countnes with their weak
econorrues. huge socral problems due to the




59. Thc economrc development of the
Medrterrancan countnes rs closelv linked to
ennronmcntal factors ln the reglon. The
detcnoralon of the envrronment is rncreasrrgl-v
threaterung lts econonxc devclopment. The problem
\\'as made abundanth' clear at the Barcelona
Conference. uhere partrcrpants higtrhghted their
rrterdependence m enlrronmental matters and the
need for a regronal approach and rrcreased
cooperatron They decided to set up pnonty action
prograrnmes. Water supplies are an issue of such
rmportance as to be the cause of numerous bilateral
drsputes betu-een countnes to the south ard east of
the Medrterranean and those attendrng the
Barcelona Conference nghtly recogrused tlus as a
pnonty' rssue for all Medrtenanean parbners and
agrccd on the need to extend cooperatron in ttus
field
60 The energv sector rs of srmrlar rmportance,
partrcularh' as far as orl and natural gas are
concemed Approxrmatel>' 4lo/oof Europc's orl and
natural gas supphes are routed through the
Medrterranean and there are ma1or prpelrres
crossmg Algena and Morocco w'hrch suppll'Europe
na Spaur Horvever countnes such as Itall'are also
dependent rn large measurc on oil and natural gas
supphes from Algena and Libya
6l It has not 1'et proved possible to estabhsh a
form of regional corrrmon market m the southem
Medrterranean Attempts to create an economic
commuruq'bnngrng together Middle Eastern and
No(h Afncan countries (MENA) uere made under
the aegis of the Presrdents of the Uruted States and
Russn b1' orgarusrrg an cconomic summrt held on
30 October and I November 1994 rn Casablanca.
u'hrch x'as follou'ed b1' a second. convened rn
Amman on 29 October 1995 A tturd conference m
the senes rs to take placc rn Cairo from 12 to 14
November Hou'ever. the connection betll'een
progress on tlus rmtiatrve 
- 
rrvolr,rng a largc
number of Mrddle Eastem countnes rncludrng Isracl
and the North Afrrcan states 
- 
and the peace
process betrveen Israel and rts nerghbours, cannot bc
ignored and rs elrdent from Egypt's threat to cancel
the conference rf Israel refuses to comply with its
undertakmgs touards the Palesturians, particularll'
as regards the u'ithdrarval of its troops from
Hebron.
62. Another senous problem is the
unemplolment rate rn most of the southem
Mediterranean countnes. which exceeds 25% n
some cases and affects young people rr partrcular.
The rmpovenshment of the peoples concemed,
togethcr urth exponential demographrc growth s
lcadrng to mcreased mrgration, partrcularly tox,ards
thc European countnes Accordrng to some
estmates, the populatron of thc Arab countnes is
lkely'to go up b1' 90% from 1990 to 2025 as
agarnst a nse of onlv 6%o rn European countncs
63. The problem of northrvard mrgratron rs hkely
to u.orsen rn vears to come. unless wavs can be
found of creatrng equalll' advantageous economic,
socral and cultural condrtions m the south whrch
rull reheve mrgratory pressures and even cause
them graduallv to drsappear. One of the marn
features of thrs problem rs ts psychologrcal
dimensron, urasmuch as it is closely linked to the
perceptrons both the European and non-European
populations on the southem shores of the
Medterranean have of rt It rs no secret that many
Europeans regard the problem of mrgration from thc
south not only as a social and economrc challenge
and a problem oforgarusatron but also as a threat to
the cultural rdentrtl' of the northem countnes, and
the unease felt rn those countnes has reached such a
point as to precrpltate protests that mrgratron is a
danger to the mternal secunty' and stabrlrty of some
European countnes
64. Such l,rervs, u'tuch are grven a hostrle
receptron ur the countnes of the south, hardly help
to estabhsh mutual trust. still senouslv undermrned
by,the profound drfferences ufuch persrst betrveen
North and South in terms of their cultural and
religious tradrtions as u'ell as ther polrtical systems.
Fhstorl,rn partrcular has done httle to contnbute to
the development of a chmate of trust between
Europe and the Arab uorld From the conquest of
Islam to coloruahsm and the crusades to
decoloruahsatron, the relatronship between Europe
and the Muslm rvorld has for centunes been based
on antagorusm, punctuated nonetheless by penods
u'hen both crnlsatrons have managed to hve side by
srdc m pcace and prospenh.
2. Political Islamism
65. The rvay rn ufuch Europe and the countries
around the Medrtenanean basrn vierv each another
is a sourcp of real difficu[v and in many respects
relatrons are strll marked by drstrust, not to mention
fear. On the European srde there are very strong
apprehensrons about mrlrtant Islamrc fundament-
alism as a hostile force seekmg to overtum the
eustlng political order not merely rn certarn
t6
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southem Medrterranean cowrtnes but even rn
Europe itself There are hvo tlpes of Islamist
movement: those seekrng to transform the exstrng
polrtical order by usurg violence and those tr_r,rng to
achieve that goal through democratrc means such as
parhamentary electrons. However. some fear that
onc€ m po\4€r, the Islarrust movcments wrll take
advantage of their position to abolish the entre
sl,stem of democratrc elections.
66 Anxretres on thrs score tend to be
expressed mainll' m European countries and are
vrerved askance by political circles in the
countrres of the South, u'hrch see in them, mter
aha, an additronal srgn of European lack of
understandmg of the specific nature of the
Muslim world and its problems. Arguments such
as those vorced b1,the former NATO Secretarl-
General, Wrllv Claes, to the effect that Islamic
fundamentalism was westem Europe's greatest
challenge since the ending of the cold u'ar, have
helped to fuel Muslim countrres' suspicion and
drstrust of the West.
67. Holever, some Muslim countries
themselves admrt that the activitics of extreme
Islamrst movements rank among the dangers that
threaten their secunty and stabrlrtl', as the
Egrptran Mmrster for Foreign Affarrs acknorv-
ledged dunng hrs talks r,uth your Rapporteur.
Eglpt appears to count rtself among those
countnes that x'ould be open to joint
development of ideas b1' both European and
Mushm countries wrshrng to find ways of
respondmg together to the challenges facing them
that would not be seen as interference in the
intcrnal affarrs of the countries involved. An
example of Eglpt's cooperative attitude is the
initiative taken by President Mubarak rn l99l
towards creating a Mediterranean forum for
developing dialogue and cooperatron rn all fields
betrveen a number of Mediterranean countrres.
68. How to respond to Islamic fundamentahsm
is undoubtedly one of the rssues on rvhich
information is most seriously lackrng and which
leads to the greatest number of misun-
derstandings between European countries, the
United States and Islamrc countries. While fun-
damentahst Islamrst forces already hold power in
countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Sudan and
Maurrtania, Islamrst movements are trying to
impose fundamentalist regimes elsewhere by
vrolent means, particularlf in Algeria and Egypt,
wtth some degree of support from Iran (rr
Algeria's case) anC Sudan (rr the case of Egpt)
Other countnes, such as Turusia and Morocco. havc
follorved a programme of emancipatron and
progress for lvomen which makes them less
vulnerable to the threats inherent m fundamentahsm
69 It would be wrong to concludc that the
followers of Islam constrtute a homogenous force
determined to act as part of a universal
conspirao' against thc existing politrcal order.
The fact is that Islam rs made up of highly
diversrfied groups Some fundamentalist
movements advocate vrolence in the name of
Islam and are roundly' condemned by most
Muslim political leaders rvho consider that this
does not conform to the pnncrples of Islam as a
rehgion and merelv brrngs rt mto drscredit
throughout thc rvorld. One example of such
groups is the Islamrc Army' of Salvation (AIS).
It was founded in Algeria in 1992 as the armed
branch of the FIS (Islamic Salvatron Front).
which r,r'as drssolved in March 1992
70. The crvil rvar that broke out rn Algcrra
because of the cancellation of the results of the
parliamentary electrons in December 1991, rvhich
were \\'on by the FIS, did not cnd u'rth the
presidential elections of 16 Novcmber 1995 that
gave General Zeroual a resounding victory
despite threats to thc clectorate from Islamist
extremists According to rnformation in the
Ramses 97 revrcw, armed groups belonging to
the opposrtron dcstro-ved no less than 200 toxn
halls. more than 600 schools and a number of
local administrative buildings, thus rarsing
senous doubts as to u'hether the electrons could
bc held normallv. Again accordmg to Ramses 97,
the Armed Islamrc Group (GIA) had rssued a
clear waming advising electors not to vote unless
they wanted to see the ballot box become a
"coffln".
7 | . The GIA is accused of being behind all the
assassinations of foreigners which havc taken
place in Algeria, the highjackrng of the Arr
France Airbus, the 1995 wave of bomb attacks in
France and the death of seven European monks
in Algena. Smcc then, the regrme led by
Mr Zeroual has been trying to bring together all
the various polrtrcal groups throughout the
country. A huge "reconcrhation" conference
designed to pavc the way for democratic reforms
and establish the condrtions necessary for holding
parhamentary electrons took place in Algiers on
15 September thrs year but many political
t'7
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movements and partles refused to take part and rt
is not certam that the confcrcnce x'as able to
make anv progress tou,ards restorlng peace
72. Eglpt has the Gamaat al-Islamrva
movement to rvhich responsrbrlrtv has bcen
attrrbuted for attacks against Copts. poltcemcn
and tourists There is also the Islamrc Jrhad
group, rvhrch \\'as responsrble for the
assassrnatron of Presrdent Sadat in l99l The
En-Nahda or Renarssance Partr'. rvhose lcadcr ts
rn exrle m London, operates tn Tuntsra.
73 Whrle rt rs important not to confuse the
actrvrties of terronst groups urth those of radical
Islamrst movemcnts sccking to take power m
some countnes, rt ls not ahvavs easv to
drstrngursh betu'cen them as therc ts often some
interaction betu'een the tu'o But a radrcal
movement whrch seeks elcctron to government
wrthout committing or supportmg vrolent actlon
cannot be regarded as a terronst group
74. During a semlnar rn Parrs rn Junc 1996
orgarused bl the WEU Instrtute for Secuntv
Studres, rt became clear that the vanous
governments had adopted drfferent approachcs rn
thetr relatrons urth Islamrst polrtrcal movements
Thrs analvsrs drstmgurshes the "eradicators" rvho
arc ln favour of the total exclusion of radical
Islamrsts from the politrcal arena (as rs currentlv
the practrcc rn Algena and. to a more subtle
degree. rn Eg1'pt and Turusta) from those lvho
adopt a pohcv of "assrmilatron". or the
controlled and limrtcd rnvolvement of Islamists rn
polrtrcal hfc, although not to the point of their
takrng part in electrons. Such rs the case in
Morocco Lastlv, resort mav be had to the
"rntegratron" modcl. u'hrch rs not apphed at
present in any of the countrres concerned The
latter moreover responded lcss than enthus-
rasticall)' to a confercncc of Islamrc fundamen-
tahsts held rn London last Scptember and
organrsed b1' a group seekmg the creatron of a
u'orldrvrde Islamrc order and the ol'erthrou'.
uslng vrolent means. of all the present
govcrnments rn the Mrddle East
75 The burnrng question for European
countnes rn thrs context rs u'hether and to what
extent thel' should regard themselves as requrred
to lntcn'ene rn thc problems of the countnes on
the opposrte shorc of the Mediterranean.
Interventron b1' Europc u'ould undoubtedll' be
problematrc rf rt u'crc based exclusivelv on
consrderatrons as to u'hethcr thc secuntv of the
contment u'as threatencd by' the actrvrtres of
political Islamist movements
76 After all, rt cannot be asserted as a gcncral
principle that a countn' led bv a fundamcntahst
government is bound to follou pohcres hostrlc to
Europe and the u'estern u'orld. What then arc thc
valucs shared b1' Europe and the Mushm
countncs on the opposrte shore of the
Mcdrterranean that give them good reason to
u'ork out a corrrmon conceptron of the problem of
polrtrcal Islamrsm'l In the Barcelona Declaration
adoptcd at the Euro-Medrterranean Conference
held on 27 and 28 November 1995, all the
particrpants subscnbcd to such sharcd values as
democracl' and respect for human rights and
hence supported actron that \\'as hkelv to
strengthen democratrc instrtutrons, the rule of lau'
and crvrl soclct). In order to develop a concep-
tlon common to Europe and the non-Europcan
Mediterranean countnes on the basrs of thrs
inrtial consensus 
- 
assumlng Europe docs not
impose rt on the other partrcrpant countrrcs 
- 
rt
u'ould be necessan-to reach a pomt s'here those
values are properlv recognrsed and rcspccted bt,
the Islamrc countrres
3. Ihe fight against teruorism and organised crime
77 Dcsprte all these efforts. the need to protect a
natlon agamst terronsm and combat rt rr all its
forms remaurs a ma;or problem confrontrng Europe,
thc Urutcd Statcs and the Mushm countncs ahlie In
order to fight tenonsm. rt u'rll be essential to
rdentrfv rts ongms, ufuch are cxtremelv drverse.
Terronsm cafirot be put on the same footrng as
radrcal Islamrsm. In the fight agamst tcrronsm. the
marn pornts to note arc the fragmcnted nature of an1'
rrutiatives and the lack of anv common asscssment
and thurkrng. partrcularll' rn Europc and the Uruted
Statcs Nthough a summrt me€tmg held at Sharm-
el-Sherkh ur March 1996 brought together thc Arab
countnes and Israel rrrth a lre*'to the partrcrpants
dcclanng thcir determrnation to fight terronsm
togcther, the pursurt of that rruIatne rs hkcll' to
depcnd on the progress of the Mrddle East peacc
process In an] el'cnt. rt rs clear that breakrng off
the peace process iiill probabl)'tngger a u'avc of
terronsm m thc occuprcd temtones and rn Israel
78 Europc and the Uruted States drffer m ther
\fer\ s on hou' to dcal urth state terronsm and on
sanctrons to bc rmposcd agarnst states alleged to
Itt
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support terronsm The Uruted States rvas ready to
identifi'and expressl)'rurmc countries whrch. rn its
vlew. encouragc terronsm, such as Iraq, Iran, Libya
and Sudan, and to lmpose economic sanctions on
them The cntena taken by the Uruted States as a
basrs for drau.rng up ttus hst are, hotrever. not clear
and it is sometrmes drfficult to understand the
pnnciples underlyrng rts pohcy of assistrng the
Tahban (radrcal Islarrust movement) in Afghanistan
or certaut Kurd factlons. and cutturg off such
countnes from the urtematronal community.
Congress has been encouraged to pass anfl-terronst
legrslation aimed at firms m allied countnes that
contrnue to trade urth countnes on the Uruted States
"black list" It ma1,be asked why that hst does not
rnclude Pakistan. u'luch has openly encouraged the
Tahban u'ho took control of Kabul rn September
1996 It rs rcmarkable that the United States should
have encouraged thrs movement.
79 In contrast- European countnes, especialll'
France. have expressed strong rcservatrons about
thc rdca of such a hst and even opposltron to it.
Horvever, countrres represented at thc G7 antr-
terronsm confcrence held rn Pans m late Jull' of
thts vear succeeded m reachrng agreement on a
senes of measures to fight terrorrsm, both insrde
therr o\\rr borders and in a framervork of
international cooperatron. Strengthening cooper-
ation to prevent and fight terrorism is.
furthermore. one of the ob.;ectrves to which those
attendrng the Barcelona Conference subscribed.
Horver.er there is still a long u'a1, to go before
effective 
.1omt strategies can be developed to
counter this persrstent threat. It should be borne
in mrnd in this connection that there is as yet no
jornt pohcl'. even u,rthin the European Union,
ruth regard to either the internal aspects of the
problem or thc areas covered bl,the CFSP, that
is. action to be taken outsrde the Unron.
80 Lrkc manv other rcgions of the world, the
Medrterranean has been hrt b1' the spread of
organrsed cnme and rts drvcrsificatron rnto new
areas and b1' drug traffickrng. The fight against
these tu'o evrls u'as included on the agenda for
the Barcelona Conference,
,1. Trends in military expenditure in the region
81. The prevar[ng militarl' situatron rn the
Mediterranean reglon must be anall,sed from
several angles It should be noted from the outset
that the Mediterranean rs no longer the potential
theatre of East-West confrontatron. The naval
prescncc of the countnes that emerged from the
former Sovict Unron has all but disappeared from
the arca lvhrlc Russra's role m the regron rs not
comparable to that of the former Sovret Uruon
Convcrsell', the mrlrtary presence of NATO and
in particular of the Unrted States means that the
latter is the onh' superpower left rn the regron
This srtuatron rs leadrng those Mediterranean
countnes uhrch are not members of the Alhance
to question the alms and purposes of that
presence in view'. mter alia. of the change in the
doctnne of the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, NATO
activitres are no longer restncted to defending an
area defined b1'the Washington Treaty but may
extend to regions u'hrch u'ere formerlr' "out of
area". as rllustrated for example b1, NATO's
mterverung to put an end to the armed conflrct m
thc Balkans The dialogue partners of the
southern Medrterranean countnes are also
questionrng the arms served b1' the creation of
raprd rcactron forces and the purpose of gcncral
NATO enlargement
82. Moreover the aim of cstabhshrng forces
ansrverable to WEU (FAWEU) in the Mcdr-
terranean, such as Eurofor and Euromarfor, as
agreed bv France. Itall' and Sparn rvith Portugal's
involvement, is far from clear to the non-
European Medrterranean countrles. They
wonder rvhat these units are to be used for. Are
thel'to rntervene m an mter-Arab conflict or rvrll
thev be made avarlable as necessan, to Arab
countries for peacekeeprng tasks?
83. Essential as it ma1, be to reflect on and
explarn the role of the \\'estem alhanccs in the
Medrtcrrancan reglon. consrderation must also bc
given to forces and armaments development in
countnes rnvoh'ed rn conflrcts or brlateral
disputes m the regron
84 Iraq provrdes no mformatron rcgarding its
military expendrture, hence the SIPRI l,earbook
docs not put anl' figure on the country's financral
outlay for the purpose of rebuildrng rts armed
forces follorvrng losses during the Gulf War.
Hou'ever, accordmg to The Mrhtary Balance
1995i96. edrted b1' the International Instrtute for
Strategrc Studres (IISS). the percentage rate
allocated to mrlrtan' expenditure in Iraq's budget
has risen since 1993. There are in any event
signs indrcating that. over the five I'ears that have
elapsed since the Gulf War, the country has
succeeded rn reburlding an impressive conven-
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tronal force numbenng some 350 000 regular
soldiers and 650 000 reserves and roughll' 2700
battle tanks. includrng a large number of T-72s.
assrgned spccificallv to the Rcpublican Guard
and the presrdentral guard Moreover, smce the
Gulf War. Iraq has set up a krnd of raprd-action
force of some 30 000 crack troops5.
85. Regardrng countrles mvolved in the
Mrddle East conflict. the percentage figures given
for therr respecttve mrlrtary expenditure as
compared to gross domestic product vary
according to the sources of drfferent information.
Accordrng to SIPRI's 1996 vearbook, Israel has
steadill' reduced its expenditure from l6Yo of
GDP in 1986 to 9 5oh n 1994. The same trend
rs apparent in the case of S1'rra (do$n from
14 4% rn 1986 to 8 5% rn 1994). Egypt reduced
its mrlrtarl' expendtture from 7 .8oh to 3 3oh over
thc same penod, although accordrng to thc IISS's
The Mrhtary Balance an increase rvas recorded
for Eglpt from 5 1%"to 5 9o% betrveen 1993 and
1994 The Mrhtary Balance shows Jordan
reducmg expendtture betu'ecn 1993 and 1994
u'hereas SIPRI maintams there rvas a shght
lncroase over the same period
86 Trends tn Iran's mtlttary expendtture are
more diffrcult to assess. In terms of GDP,
spendrng fell from 3o/oto 1.8% in 1993 according
to the 1996 SIPzu 1'earbook, u'hich takes as tts
basis statistics supphed by public sources rvhich
perhaps underesttmate the country''s actual
defence outlay The Mihtary Balance maintams
that Iran's mtlttan' spendrng rose from 3 4o/o to
3 8% of GDP betrveen 1993 and 1994. It should
also be bome tn mmd that, as exprcssed m
Amencan dollars. expenditurc bv Iran, lvhrch fell
untrl 1989. prcked up agaln )'ear on y'car betu'ecn
1990 and I994 Horvever, there are differenccs
betrveen the estlmates glven in the SIPzu
y'earbook and tn the IISS's The Mthtary Balance
87. While the 1996 SIPRI yearbook provides
no data on Lrbl'a, The Mrhtary Balance refers to
a slight rncrease in the country's mrlitary'
expenditure. rvhrch rose from 3.3o/o of GDP rn
1993 to 3.7Yo rn 1994. The Mrhtary Balance
records a fall rn Algeria's defence spending from
2.9oh n 1993 to 2.7%o rn 1994, while the 1996
SIPzu y-earbook shorn's a steady rise from 1991
onrvards (13% rn 1991, 2o/o in 1992. 27Yo in
5. The Mtltary Balance 1995.'96 and Internatronal
Herald Tnbune,l0 September 1996.
1993 and 3 3oh n 1994) For Morocco, SIPRI
records dcfence spending as douryt from 3 9o/o n
1993 to 38o/o n 1994 rvhereas T'he Mtlttary
Balance puts thc figurcs at 4o/o rn 1993, nsing to
4 3o/o tn 1994 Accordrng to both sources
Tunrsra has held mrlrtary spcndrng stcady' at a
lou' level in recent r"cars






other members, reduced therr mrlitary spending
In the case of Greece, mrlrtary expenditure as a
percentage of GDP has been held constant since
1992 at 5.60/o (SIPzu) According to The
Mrhtarl, Balance it stood at 5lo/o in 1994.
SIPzu puts Turker,''s spending at 4 2o/o of GDP
betrveen 1988 and 1994 (T-he Mrhtary Balance,
hou'ever, records a fall. from 4%o rn 1993 to
3.2o/o n 1994)
89. Among the mam conventlonal armaments
rmporters from 1991-95. SIPzu ranks Turkcl'
number one. follou'ed by Egypt and Saudr
Arabia m second and thrrd postttons Greecc
follorvs rn fifth place. Israel rn erghth, Kuw'ait
trvelfth. rvith Algerra ranked as 3lst and Svna
and Morocco rn 33rd and 44th places
respecttvelr'.
90. Conventronal arms imports follow a
universal dounu'ard trend, Kulvait and S1'ria
being the exceptions, and generally' speakrng
there rs no evtdence of anv neu' conventtonal
arrns race rn the Medrterranean region. Trends in
the proliferatron of \reapons of mass destructton
and therr means of conveyance in both the
Mrddle East and North Afrrca are an issue of far
greatcr concem
5. The proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of convqtance
91 Grven the relatrvell' short drstances bctrveen
the countnes mvolved rn thc Middle East peace
process, the development of relatrvely short-range
ballistrc mrssrles mav alreadl' be assuming malor
unportance for the way m w'hrch each country'
concemed perceives the mtentions of the others.
Wlule Israel has developed its Jencho l, 650 lcn-
range and Jencho 2. I 500 km-range mrssiles, Saudr
Arabra has Chrnese CSS 2 mrssiles uith a range of
2 700 kn. Iran and Slna have taken delivery of
North Korean Scud C, 500 km-range missiles,
u'hrle Lrby'a, Iran and Eglpt have Scud B, 300 km-
range mrssrles Work on developrrg ballistic
20
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mrssrles ur the 600 to 2 500 lon-range is berng
carried out mainly b1' Pakrstan. North Korea,
Indra and Israel. In this arca. North Korca rn
particular rs pursumg a vcr)' aggressivc cxport
pohcv ln relation to rts ballistrc mrssile
technologli
92. The srgnrficance of this trend in the
prohferation of ballistrc rveapons rs hnked to the
questron of the twc of explosive charge thcv are
able to carry. Grven Israel's nuclear capabilitl'
and its refusal to srgn the nuclear non-
proliferation trcat.v, Eglpt, mter aha. has
redoubled rts cfforts to acquire a capabilitv in
ballistic mrssiles and chemrcal charges. for the
exclusive purpose, according to informatron
provided by' )'our Rapporteur's Eglptran
contacts, of preserving the country's vital
interests and not g'ith anv intent to reach a
partrcular enemv. such as Isracl
93. In this connectron. u'hen asked rvhether
Egl'pt u'as about to procure Scud B or C mrssrles
from North Korea, vour Rapporteur's Eglptran
contacts \\'ere some\\hat evasive in therr replv
but stated that the range of both fell urthin the
limits set by the MTCR (Mrssile Tcchnology
Control Regime) 
- 
meanmg that it must be belou'
300 km. The Egyptrans also refused to state
outrrght rvhether the1, rvere rn thc process of
acqurring a chemrcal capabilitv.
94. In a broader context. it should also be
noted that according to Turkrsh estrmates. Iran
may alreadv have biological and chemrcal
capabilities and be in a positron to producc
nuclear \\'eapons rvrthin l5 1'cars urthout forergn
assrstance and even rvithin l0 rvith such
assistance. Again accordrng to Turkish sources,
within 5-7 years, rvhen Iraq is no longer bound
by UN Security Council Resolutrons, rt too could
produce nuclear weapons. Libya may bc tn'rng
to procure nuclear weapons from Russra and
rvould be capable of producrng the chemical
weapons rt mav hal'e uscd in Chad.
95 S1.ria, on the other hand, u'as unhkelv to
have either nuclcar wcapons or the capabrlitl to
manufacture them. It seemed only to be rvorking
on civrlian apphcatrons of nuclear tcchnology'.
Algeria was ln all probabilrtv reccrving nuclear
technologl, assistance from Argentrna and China.
6 For details see The Militarv lJalance 1995'96,
International Instrtute for Strategic Studics (IISS).
96 Hon'ever, even though thcrc are sure srgns
in the regron of proliferation of \\'eapons of mass
destruction and their means of convevance. rt rs a
mattcr of conjecturc as to u'hether thrs
development is mevrtablv a direct threat to
Europe Thrs rarses questions as to thc rclcvancc
of thc follou'lng comment rn the Ma1' 1996 issue
of the NAI'O revtew'
"The southern members of NATO rrrll be
thc first to fccl the political and mrlrtarr,
consequences of proliferatron trends on
Europe's pcrrphcry' (major Turkrsh cities
are alreadl' nrthm rangc of mrssiles
deplol'cd rn Iran and Svna) These
countncs u'ill becomc mcreastngll'
lulncrablc to attacks and pressure from
across thc Mediterranean. Faced u'rth
thcsc ncu'threats, thel' ma.v be less rvilling
to offer support and facilities for
contingencies m thc Mrddle East and thc
Gulf, thus undercuttrng US strategl' But
even if thev do provide access to such
facrlrties. the draloguc ruth the US on
these matters rs hkell'to be quite drfferent
if Madrrd, Nrce or Naples are at rrsk."
97. Although rt docs not do to minrmrse the
dangers of developmcnts ln balhstrc mrssile
technology'. it appears that the countrres
prrmanlv threatencd b1' such developments are
thc Mrddle Eastern and North African countrres
on account of the varlous rcgronal conflicts
bets'een thcm. Hcncc there is no cause for fear
of a conflrct bctu'ccn those countrics and Europe.
6. homoting arms control and disarmament
98. Ncvcrtheless an approprratc starting point
must bc thc consensus reached at the Barcelona
Conference where all those attendrng agreed to
"promote regronal secuntv by acting,
tnter aha. ln favour of nuclear,
chemical and brologrcal non-prohf-
eration through adherence to and
compliance luth a combinatron of
international and regional non-
prohferatron reglmes, and arms control
and drsarmament agreemcnts such as
NPT, CWC, BWC. CTBT and/or
rcgronal arrangements such as \\'eapon-
free zones includrng thcrr venficatron
regrmes, as rvell as b1,fulfilhng in good
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farth their commitments under arms
control, disarmament and non-prohf-
eratlon conventrons;
pursue a mutually and cffectively
venfiable Middlc East zone- free of
\\€apons of mass destrucfion. nuclcar,
chemrcal and brologrcal, and ther
delivery svstems.
consider practical steps to prevent the
prohferatron of nuclear. chemrcal and
brological \\'eapons as l'ell as excessive
accumulatron of conventronal arms. "
99 It remams to be seen u'hether such atms may'
not prove too ambitious for it to bc possrble. for
example, to relaunch rmtiatrves u'hosc ongrral
purpose u'as to put an end to the Israeli-Arab
conflict Srnce the Madrid peacc conference in
1991. a u'orkrng group on Arms Control and
Regronal Secunry' (ACRS) has been sct up
compnsmg all countncs involved in the conflict
Horvever, its u'ork is strll subject to a bolcott b1'
Syna and rs berng hrndercd b1'drfferences bctn'een
Eglpt and Israel on hou'nuclear rssues should be
dealt u-rth Surce Mr Netanvahu took ovcr as hcad
of govemment rn Israel. the entire process has been
suspended
7. The importance of public opinion
100 No analy'srs of the political situation rn the
countnes bordenng on the Medrterranean can be
complete rrrthout mentioning the rmportant role
plal'ed by public opinion, u'hrch does not
necessarilv reflect govemment pohcies or options
pursued b1' pohtrcal partrcs rn thc parliaments of
those countries Dunng the Gulf War rn partrcular.
decrsrons b1' govemments, especialll' of those
countncs belongurg to thc fuab Leaguc, moved u'av
out of step lvith popular feehng The governments
concemed rvere dmded as to u'hat position to adopt
u-rth regard to Iraqr actron agamst Kuuart. Only
Egpt. Morocco and Slna took part rn the
multmatronal coalrtion. ufule Tunisia pleaded rn
vam for an Arab solutron to thc conflrct. Algcna
and Lrbya took no part ur the anti-Iraq coalitron.
rvlule Mauntarua supported Iraq. Jordan also
provrded Iraq u.rth pohtical support as dd Yasser
Arafat's PLO.
101 Horvever ur all these countnes. the wrder
pubhc 
- 
u'hrch felt rgrored and consrdered that the
"neu'mtematronal order" adl'ocated b1,the then US
Presrdent George Bush u'as unlust 
- 
stood b1' Iraq
ur condemrung operatron "Desert Storm". u'hrch
was sctn as an attempt to destroy' an fuab srstcr-
state. Thc pubhc demonstratrons of support for Iraq
rvhich took place. especralll' rn Algena, Turusn and
Mauntama. took on an antr-u'cstcm or natronahst
character Hcncc radrcal Islanust movements could
dralv support from the feellngs of the man ln the
street. Ttus drstrust of the Wcst and of Europe ur
partrcular u'as remforced by'the connction among a
large section of the Mushm pubhc that Europeans
had little or no concem for u'hat happened to the
Bosruan Mushms dunng the war rn former
Yugoslalra
102. Generalll' spcakrng. fuab pubhc oprnon
points to the West's use of double strndards and
accuses rt of shourng shockng partralrty' towards
Israel The Arabs pont out that the State of Israel
has nolated United Nations resolutions on ovcr hlo
hundred occ;lsrons xithout sanctions ever havmg
been rnposed In contrast. rt is common thmkng
among the Arab public that the West treats therr
countrics wrth a casualness. scom and partrahlv
thel'find humrhatrng.
III. Policy optionsfor Europe andfor IYEU
103 If t rs hoped to estabhsh a coherent
European policy'for deahng urth the Medterranean
reglon, several basrc factors must be taken into
account from the outsct:
first. there are a number of regronal
conflrcts u'hrch. u'llle thel'havc varyrng
ongrns and rnvolve drfferent countnes,
are constantlv tlreatemng to detenorate
and spread cvcn further. there is alu'avs
the nsk they'u-rll sabotage thc scarch for
global solutions for the region as a uholc.
second. there rs the fact that Europc has
so far been unable to agree on a common
poho,towards the Middle East because
European countnes have drffercnt
pnonhes lvhen it comes to deahng urth
the problems m that reglon
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104 Consequentlr'. ncrther Europc. as
organrsed rn the framovork of the European
Unron. nor its members actrng singlv or as a
group of states, are maJor plavers rn the Mrddle
East. u'hcrc thc Unrted States has had urtually'
sole domrnance over the srtuatron since Russra,
the Sovret Unron's princrpal succcssor, all but
u'ithdreu from the scene. Convcrscll'. rt u'ould
secm that Turkev, a major factor in thc
managemcnt of sccuritf issues rn the eastern
Mediterrancan, ls bound to take on more
rmportance
105 Somc obscrvcrs mamtain that rvhcn US
polrtrcrans refer to the Medrterrancan basrn. thel'
thrnk first and foremost of the eastern
Medrterranean 
- 
especialll' the Gulf, Greece and
Turkcl'- and the Black Sea area Basicalll,'. the
Amencans appear to regard the Mediterranean as
a sprrng-board to the Mrddle East and the Gulf,
u'hrle European pohcy-makers have the r,r'estern
Medrterranean. especrallv thc Maghreb countncs,
uppermost rn therr mindsT Hou'ever. the Euro-
pean Unron Barcelona Conference, to rvhich all
the Medrterranean coastal states rvrth thc
exceptlon of Lrbl'a rvere rnvrtcd. rs evrdence that
Europc has bcgun to see the Medrterranean basrn
as a region forming a u'holc and has trred to
appll' solutrons accordinglr..
106. But thc crucral question ls u'hat
contributron thc Barcelona proccss, urth rts lvidc
and ambrtrous remlt spanning the cntrre range of
polrtrcal, secuntr', economlc and cultural rssues.
can make tou'ards rcsolving the hrghlv specrfic
conflrcts raging along the penmctcr of the
Medrtcrranean. Docs the Confercnce's stated
rntcntron to create an area of peace and stabilrtl'
throughout the regron mcan that the Europcan
Unron rs preparing to takc specific mrtrativcs to





the problems in the Gulf,
- 
thc question of Cvprus and drsputes
bet*'een Greece and Turker'.
- 
the effccts of the conflict rn thc Balkans
on securltv rn the Mediterranean, and
7 Scc Mediterrancan sccuntv Nerv challengcs. ne\\'
tasks,.\i.170 ret)tew, Ma-v 1996.
- 
the other brlatcral conflicts that drvrde
ccrtam North Afrrcan countnes?
107 Thc Confercnce rtsclf offered a partral
ans\\'cr to thrs question b1' "stressrng that this
Euro-Medrtcrranean inrtratr',c rs not intended to
replace the other actrvrties and rnitratrves
undertaken rn the interests of thc peace, stabrlrtl'
and development of the region. but that it ivrll
contnbute to therr success". Onlv one conflict.
the Arab-Israeh onc. rs expresslv mcntioned m
this context ln thc follorvrng terms: "the
partrcipants support thc realisatron of a just,
comprehensn'e and lastrng pcace scttlcmcnt in the
Mrddle East based on the relevant Unrted Natrons
Secunty' Council resolutions and prmcrples
mentroned rn the letter of rnl'rtatron to thc Madrrd
Middle East Peace Conference. rncludrng the
princrple of land for peacc. rvrth all that thrs
imphcs"
108 But could and should Europe plav a more
specific rolc m the Middle East peace process?
Thrs leads to another questlon should Europc
plal'rts part rn or outsrdc the Barcelona process'/
Until nou. thc United States has vrrtualll' "gone
rt alone" m actlng as a medrator bctrveen Israel
and the Arab countries, partrcularlv rn seeking to
bring about a resumption of the dialogue betrveen
Israel. S1'rra and the Palestrnran Authonty', n'hrch
ground to a halt after Mr Netanvahu's partv u'on
thc clections rn Israel Of thc European
countnes. onlv France has made an1' effort of
substance to help continue the pcacc process
Prcsrdcnt Chirac's visrt in October 1996 to Svrra.
Isracl, Palestine, Jordan and Egrpt u'as further
evidcnce of French resoh'e. It also confirmed
that the European Unron uas strll verl' divrded
over rts orrn role and the arm of an1, mvolvement.
All the EU did rvas to rssue jotnt declaratrons
commrttrng rt to lrttle actron, even rn the
drplomatic arena.
109. Thcrc rs no doubt that the Unrted States'
ambitron to bc the onll'pla1'cr in the negotiatrons
on the Middlc East peacc process is provoking
lncreaslng rrrrtatron and even annoYance rn the
Arab countries
110. Your Rapportcur u'as struck b1'thc r,rrulence
of Arab leaders uhcn dcnouncrng this dcsre to
domrnate on the part of thc United Statcs.
I I l. They are appealing to Europe to act as a
countenverght but notc that, xrth the exceptron of
23
DOCUMENT I543
France. Europe rs cxtremelv reticent and that the
Unrted States rs mtcnt upon keepurg rt out of any
political uritiative in thc Middle East The cavaher
u'ay ur rvtuch Mr Warren Chnstopher sought to
rebuffthe efforts of the French Miruster for Foreign
Affars. uslng cvcn' possible means at tus drsposal
m order to keep France out of the talks aimed at
sohrng the Lcbancse cnsis \\.as not lost on Arab
leaders. It took a concerted effort by S1na.
l.ebanon and Eglpt before the Amencans agreed to
France co-chamng the comrrusslon glven a renxt to
morutor the border behlccn Isracl and Lebanon
Your Rapporteur rvould stress that such vrolent
denuncratron of "Amencan hcgemonr'" ls also
prcvalcnt ln countnes such as Egtpt- desprte rt
berng 
- 
along urth Isracl 
- 
the mam beneficrary of
Amcncan ard. Your Rapporteur received the same
rmprcsslon of anti-Amcrican feeling dunng an
carher vlsrt to the Gulf states and Saudr Arabra.
These countnes. u'luch recen'ed protecfion from the
Umted States dunng the Gulf uar. nonetheless
dcnounce Amencan pohcy xfuch considers them to
be protectorates.
ll2 They' beheve that this explains the serious
attacks on Amencan mstallatrons that occurrcd
in Dharhan. Saudr Arabra.
113. Mr Chnton's caution, for electoral reasons,
m exertrng pressure on Mr Netanl'ahu ma1' ri'ell
stoke morc anti-Amencan fcchng at a ttme u'hen
there rs no serious slgn from the Lrkud
Govemment that it mtends to rmplement the Oslo
Accords. Actions such as the opening of the
tunnel under the al-Aqsa mosque can cl'cn be
intcrprcted as provocation
I l.l Europe therefore has an imperativc dutl' to
intervene and prcvcnt the West as a wholc from
becommg the ob;ect of this rrsing trde of
aggressiveness from an Arab ri'orld u'hose
frustratrons are beginnrng to come to the surface.
It must bervare of such sentiments provokmg a
ground suell of antr-westcrn Islamism and
threatening the stabili[, of existing moderate
regimes. Confirmatron of a European presence is
all the more necessan' given that the US air
strike agarnst Iraq in September 1996, roundlv
condemned b1' Russia, may possrbll'have given
the latter an operung to makc a come-back on the
Middle Eastcrn stage Some Arab contacts go so
far as to advocate strengtherung coordination
betrveen Europe and Russia in an effort to
redress the balance in the negotlatlons to put the
Mrddle East peace process back on track.
I 15. In an)'event. Europe should be bolder in any
movc rt makes ur respect of the conflict It is,
undeniably. fuab countnes such as Eglpt and
S1ma, the Maghreb and the Palestrruan Authonty'
that are pressurg Europe to make a more actrve
commrtnent to the Mrddle East rn order to redress
the balance of the negotntions. For most of the
Arab countnes. the Uruted States' role m the Mrddle
East is connectcd lrrth its mterest m orl resources m
the Gulf and is close tres ulth Isracl. made closer
still b1' the verl' consrderable rnflucnce the vanous
Jeursh lobbres exert on Amencan polrtics The
Arab countncs are moreover au-are of the almost
total absencc of an1' Russran policl' torvards the
reglon srrcc the break-up of the Sor,ret Uruon. whle
Europe's role there has bccn. at most, secondan'.
Dr.,rg hrs vrsit, Mr Chrrac u'as made arvare of the
Arabs' desre for Europe to be more involved ur the
peacc proc€ss In tlus connection, the decision taken
b1'the Frfteen to desrgnate a representatlvc ts a slgn
to the Arab countnes that Europe rs not mdrfferent
to the peace process It is very rnterestrng to note
that Israel. for rts part, regarded ttus EU ultratrve as
a posrtive gesture
116. Horvever. lt ls necessary to keep a sense of
proportion as regards the hostrlrtl' of many Arab
countnes to uhat they' see as thc Umted States'
desire for domrnation. Therr appeals to Europe or
even Russra contarn a good deal of rhetonc and thev
use u'ords to rvork out ther fiustratons. In actual
fact, thel' are perfectll' u'ell arvarc that the Uruted
States is the onlv countn'that can get ttungs moving
and, in partrcular, exert pressure on Mr Netany'ahu.
Proof of tlls lies rn the fact that. hke Mr Arafat, the
Israeli Pnme Mrustcr rcsponded to Presrdcnt
Clurton's summons on I October 1996 for the
purpose of restonng thc dralogue betn'een the
Israelis and the Palestmrans under the aegis of the
Uruted States.
ll7. There rs clearly' no question of allourng
Medrterranean affairs to damage the precious
mutual trust that has been carefully burlt up
betu'een Europe and the Uruted States as it is both
indrspensable for Europe's securih' and cssential for
frdmg a solution to the problems of the Middle
East and establishrng a ne\\' ordcr of peace and
stabrlitl' ur thc region There can bc no advantagc to
be garned bv Europe settrng out to exploit the
current of hostrli['the Uruted States appears to have
engendered in certarn Arab countnes, as thrs would
be damagrrg to the Amencans But by' draurng
attention to the European mark stamped on any
action, particularly in conncctron with the economrc
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development aid it brings to the region, Europe can
la1' the basrs for genume consultation rvith the
United States on all the problems Such
consultation. wfuch became difficult rr the run-up to
the Amencan presrdential elections because the
authorities \\ere very sensitive to the influencc of
certam elements of Amencan society urterested ur
Middle East matters. should become easier once the
Uruted States is rn a better positron to act ur
accordance rrrth the objectrve it shares urth Europe,
namely, the estabhshment of a just and lastrng peace
on the basrs of the Resolutions adopted by' the
Umted Natrons. to u'tuch the vanous partics have
subscribed.
118. But Europe must also heed Israel's legrtrmate
securit-v requrements. The state's boundanes, as
recogrused b1'the United Nations. make rt ertremely
rulnerable and the rveakness the PLO has drsplay,ed
ur the temtones rt is supposed to control does
notlung to portraf it as a reliablc dralogue parbrer ur
negotiations urth Israel Europe must take accourt
of thcse realrtres, u'luch make rt hard to see horv
there can be a satrsfactorl' settlement r.uthout ven
clear and brndrng rnternational guarantees to assure
Israel that ant'temtonal concession it makes bnngs
it closer to peace and does not rncrcase the threat to
its secunh'
ll9. If Europe u'ants to play' a real part ur the
settlement of the mrlrtary aspects of the Mrddle East
confltct, several condrtions must bc met. First of
all, a common polrtrcal resolve has to be generated,
along u-rth corrrmon thurkrng on the rssue wrthrn thc
frameu'ork of the CFSP and WEU. An effort could
be made. for example, to draw up a mandate for a
"Mr CFSP", xho u,ould have to be a politician r,rrth
irrefutable personal authonh', to act Ets the
European spokesman rccogruscd as such b1 the
parties to the conflict The designation by the
Fifteen of the Spanish Ambassador to Israel is a
first. though far more modest, step in the nght
directron. Moreover, actron on the part of Europe
u'ould rmply secunng the agrcement not onll' of the
fuab countnes but also of the Palestrruan AuttronS',
lr'luch seems urlhng to givc it. and above all of
Israel. lvtuch u.rll havc malor reservations The fact
that Mr Arafat held talks uith the forergrr affarrs
mrrusters of the Fifteen is an encouragurg sign that
rvould seem to prove that Europe rs aware of the
need for a harmorused poliq' on the Mrddle East
cnsis.
120. Furthermore. the fact that on 30 September
1996, on his rvav to Wastungton to hold talks urth
Mr Netanyahu and Presrdent Clrrton, Mr Arafat
made a deliberate stopover m Luxembourg to mcet
the mcmbers of the Trorka representurg the
Europcan Uruon sholvs that Europe rs still ablc to
exert some mfluence because it rs less suspect than
the Uruted States as having alrcady taken srdes m
Mrddle Eastem affairs This u'as confirmed by'the
lornt appeal from Mr Chrrac, Mr Kohl and
Mr Major to Mr Netanvahu and Mr Arafat for "an
rmmedrate resumption of the negotrations at the
highest level" and by'the vote b1' France and the
Uruted Kingdom in the UN Secuntl' Council rn
favour of restorrng the situatron pnor to thc events
of Septembcr 1996. This s an encouragrng srgn of
more awareness on Europe's part. But evcn if ft rs
nou' able to act as a countem'erght to Amencan
rnfluence, rvhat rs even more essentral ls proper
cooperatron behveen Europe and the Uruted States
over task-shanng Irutratlvcs takcn b1' Europe that
are uncoordinatcd. or even rn compctrtron wrth those
of the Uruted States, urll not serve the cause of
peace in the Mrddle East
l2l. Hon'ever, there are thosc rvho sav that if
Europe sought to coordrnate rts policl'rn the Mrddle
East rnth that of the Urutcd Statcs. rt rvould
automatrcally become totalll' dependent on the
Amencans. In rcsponse to that \.le\\' rt can be sald
that every,thrng depends on Europe's political urll
If that urll exsts, Europeans can s'ork out a
spccrfic poho' but if rt does not. Europc rull never
be anlthmg more than a political and militarl'
satcllite of the Urutcd States
122. To engender the necessan, rcsolve. Europe
must pursue thc Barcelona process rn thc three
areas drscussed at the Conferencc, regardless of
horv the situation develops on thc ground If the
ob.lectivc of the Barcelona proccss rs gcnumely to
promote peace, tlls could be actueved rrdrrectly.
mamlv b1' rvay of economrc derelopment and
through practical mcasures dcsrgned to foster
understandrng behvecn culturcs and exchanges
behveen the cinlian populatrons of the countnes
concemed. In thrs conte\t dralogue bchreen the
region's three marn rehgrons must be strengthencd.
123 The deadlock reached in the Arab-lsraeh
dralogue must not therefore prcvent further
development of the Barcelona process. especrally rn
thc areas referred to abovc Wrth regard to the
problems that most closell' affcct secunh'. a
dalogue m the extremell' broad framervork of the
Barcelona Conference must be conducted
cautiously, that rs to say, stcp b1'step.
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124 Hos'cvcr thcrc are undoubtedll' other forums
s-hcrc Europc can play' a more actrve rolc ur
promotmg Euro-Medrterr;mcan dralogue and
partnershrp in more selectrve arcas. One cxamplc rs
the rmtratrve taken by the Eglptian Prcsident. Mr
Mubarak. ur crcatrng a Medrterranean forum rr'luch
at prescnt compnses France. Greecc. Itall'.
Portugal. Sparn and Turker' from the north shorc
and Egpt. Malta. Morocco and Tunisra liom thc
south shorc At the forum's thrd mrmstenal
mcetmg hcld at Ravello on 9-10 Mav 1996. thc
participants reaffirmed therr determrnatron that rt
should bccome an rnformal framervork for dalogue
bctrveen thc countncs of thc Medrtcrranean basm on
mattcrs of common mtcrcst.
125 The Egrptrans m partrcular have exprcssed
ther resoh'c to galvamse tlus forum for dralogue
and to mcludc secun['mattcrs m rts agenda The
composrtron of the groupmg rs mterestrng. but does
not take m thc marn countnes rnvolved rn the Israeh-
Arab conflict and rts purpose rn rclatron to the morc
urdc-ranging Barcelona proccss rs unclcar Crvcn
that all the countnes in the forum are also rnl'oh'ed
rn the Barcelona process. rt could be regarded as a
subgroup that mght usefulh-deal u.rth a number of
partrcularlv sensitrve toprcs of a more general
nature. llrthout nccessanlv becomrng cmbrorled rn
drsputes connectcd urth conflicts rn thc rcglon
126 It might. for rnstance. bc an appropnatc
place to dcal urth such sublects as co€xlstcnce of
the vanous cn'ilsatrons and culturcs lrr,rng cheek bv
1ou{ around the Medrten.ulean, the problems of
polrtrcal Islamrsm and the possrbrhtl' of
strengthemng the d-ralogue betscen Chnstranin'.
Islam and Judaism urth a \lew to closer tres
betw'ccn countnes and peoples Nevertheless.
Europeans must make clear m thcse vanous
drscussron forums that their arm is to hsten to and
talk urth therr non-European Medrterranean part-
ners but wrthout any' urtenilon of rmposrng thcrr
rdeas on them.
127 . In the sphcre of sccuntl' and defencc matters.
rt is urdclv acknowledgcd that Europe rs not under
anl' mihtan' threat from the opposrte shorc of thc
Medrterranean and urll not be ur the near future
Houeler the risk of proliferatron of nuclear.
chemical and brologrcal s'eapons and therr means of
convevzurcc has bccn rdentrficd as a maJor danger to
all the countries in the regron Thrs sub;ect rs one of
thc topics to be drscussed rn the dralogue WEU has
begun urth ccrtarn North Afrrcan countnes
I28 It uould appear hou-ever that rt rs pnmanly
the Arab countnes that lvant a morc structurcd
dralogue uith Europe on secunn mafiers as thel'
thcmselvcs feel more &rcctlv thrcatened bv regronal
conflrcts than do Europcans. Hou'cver. ther farl to
scc the pornt of the offbr of a stabrlrtv pact as
enlrsaged bv the Barcelona Confercnce Moreover.
the Egrptrans clearlv told 1'our Rapporteur that thc
dalogue cstablishcd rn Brussels bctueen thc WEU
Secrctanat-General ar:d certain non-European
countnes u'as of no interest Your Rapporteur
reccrved srm-rlar rmpressrons from hs Turkrsh
contacts u'ho told hrm thev rvcre convinced that the
srll to make furthcr progress ur ths area \\'as
lackrng rr thc Councrl
129. A ma.1or shortcomrng m tlus dralogue uould
appear to be the lack of consensus behveen the
Europcan Uruon and WEU over a dnrsron of thcrr
vanous responsrbrlrtrcs rn relatron to Mcdrterranean
developments Most of the sub.;ects mcntioncd ur
thc Barcclona Declarahon rrrth a \1e\\'to creatmg a
Euro-Mcdrterrancan polrtrcal and secunrv* part-
nerstup have alreadv bcen raiscd rn thc draloguc
rnitrated bv WEU ruth Egrpt. Israel and thc
Maghreb countncs Yct WEU u'as not muted to
the Barcelona Conferencc The question that no*
ansgs ls r,rhether thc Europcan Uruon rs resolved to
grvc WEU a mandatc to takc chargc of the sccuntl
drmcnsron for u'luch Articlc J4 of the Maastncht
Trcatv makcs pro!.lslon.
130. Thrs queshon takcs on e!'en more
sigruficance gn'en that the actintrcs of WEU's
Medrterranean Group have bcen mothballed srnce
the Barcelona Confcrcnce If thc total cxclusron of
WEU fiom sccuritv problems rn thc Mcdrterrancan
rs to be avordcd. a request must be made for the
Orgarusation to be asked to submrt proposals at the
ne$ rrurustenal meetrng. to be hcld rn Apnl 1997 n
the framer,lork of the Conferencc follorr-up The
altematrvc approach. i e WEU developrng propos-
als to submrt to thc Confcrcnce rtsclf. does not seem
to have found favour urth a ma1on[- urthrn the
Council
13l Although most of the rtems on the agcnda of
the follou-up to thc Barcelona Confcrencc fall more
properly urthm thc remrt of the European Uruon
and thc CFSP. there are nel'crtheless a far number
of questions that could pror,rdc matenal for a much
morc substantral and structured &alogue bchveen
WEU and thc non-European Medrterranean coun-
tnes than rs presentlv the case.
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132. WEU should, for example, senousll'consrder
the extent to u,hich rt rrught use rts good offices to
resuscitate the actlatres of the Arms Control and
Regronal Secunty Workrng Group (ACRS). uhrch
has conturued. srnce thc Madnd peace confcrence,
to brurg together the countnes mvolvcd ur the
conflrct in the Mrddle East. The group, bovcotted
br- Slna from the outset, has rcached a stalemate
smce the recent change of govcmment rn Israel.
133. The most scnsrtrve issues m these
negotiatrons are undoubtedll, Israel's nuclear
capabrlrtv and thc condrtions under uhich that
countn'u'ould bc prepared to accede to the nuclear
non-prohferatron trea8', but the group discusses
many toprcs to uluch WEU. urth its experience,
could make a contnbution. namelr'
exchange of militan' rnformation
- 
notification of future military actrvrtl'
milrtary contacts and visits
- 
the creatron of Regronal Sccuntv
C entres/Confl ict Preventron Centres
mantlmc confi dencc-building measures
communrcatrons
134 It should also bc noted that Egypt has
made varrous proposals such as loint military
exerclses, asslstance rn the event of military
accidcnts and. most rmportantly, a major mine
clearancc prograrnme tn areas of Egrpt still
strcrvn wrth huge quantrties of mmes from the
sccond u'orld u'ar.
135 Horvever among all the other tasks, the
most rmportant one for WEU as far as the
countries of the Mrddle East and North Afrrca
are conccrned is that it should provrde detarlcd,
constantly updated information on the rcasons for
establishing forces ansrverable to WEU
(FAWEU) 
- 
such as Eurofor and Euromarfor,
formed b1, France. Italy', Spain and Portugal rn
the framervork of WEU 
- 
rvhich contrnue to be a
source ofconcem to the countrics in the south. If
these forces are to carn' out Petersberg-t1pe
mrssions (humarutanan and rescue tasks,
peacekecping and peacc-enforcement missions,
prevention of armed conflict, etc.) rvithout
excluding mrlrtarv opcratrons under Artrcle V of
thc modificd Brussels Treatl', the southern
countnes may r,vell speculate as to u'hether such
mlsslons are in anticrpation of possrble conflrct
betrveen North and South or, on the contran'.
u'hether thel' too could bcnefit from the
assistance of these forces should thc need arrse.
and even take part in thcir activrtrcs.
136 All these uncertaintrcs tend to drstract
attention from the esscntral question mark
hangrng over the role WEU and Europe rvish to
and should plav rn the Medrtcrranean region.
Evcn after thc Barcelona Declaration, there is no
clear ansu'cr to thc questron of u'hether Europe
should grve pnontv to the Medrterranean. One
of the rcasons for thrs stems from drffering vreu's
within the European Uruon on the geographrc
priontrcs to be assrgned u,hen rt comes to
u'orking out future membershrp of the Unron
Should rt concern itself prrmanlv rvith its
enlargement to the east or should rt also
conccntrate on the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership? In this context, the rncreasrng
rmportance Turkey lvill assume in Europe's
Mcdrterranean policy over the commg decadcs
must not be overlooked. Turkcv rs becomrng
rncreasinglv frustrated by the Europcan Unron's
refusal to admrt it as a mcmber state and WEU's
decrsion not to invrtc rt to become a full member
and partrcrpate in Eurofor and Euromarfor.
Mamtarrung thrs attrtude torvards Ankara could
have damaglng repercusslons for the prospects
for a settlement of the Crprus problem and the
disputes outstandrng betu'cen Turkey and
Greece Even morc rrorrpnglr', it could streng-
thcn thc cause of Turkrsh Islamrst movements,
rvhrch u,ant to drstance Turkey from Europe and
thc West.
137. The non-aligned Mediterranean countnes
also have doubts about NATO's future role m the
region and especially' about its future polrtrcal
intentions in the Medrterranean basrn. the
deployment of rts forces and the reorganrsatron of
rts command structures. What rmphcatrons does
the CJTF concept have for the Mcditerranean?
According to the May 1996 rssuc of the NATO
revtew'
"NATO's current command structure is
largcly a functron of the cold war and
remams too heavrlv onented tou'ard the
Ccntral Front Hou'ever. many' of the marn
secunt)'threats rvluch the Alhance will face
in the future are lkell' to be on Europe's
penphelv, both rrr the East and the South, as
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\\'ell as be1'ond Europc's borders NATO's
command structure nceds to bc rcorgantsed
to bettcr deal urth these threats
This reorgamsation should rncludc a ne\\'
look at AFSOUTH. NATO's pnncrpal
subordrnate command ur the Medrtcrranean
Srnce the end of the cold \\'ar thc
rcsponsrbilrles of the commander of
AFSOUTH have sigruficantll' expanded and
bccome morc complex Todaf'. he spends
about 90 pcr cent of hrs trme u'orryrng about
Bosrua Hc also has an area of strategic
ultercst that co\Iers nearlv the entire
Mcdrtcrranean up rnto thc Caucasus. If the
Alhancc rs gomg to be able to address
effectn,clv thc sccunty' challenges rn the
Medrterranean rcgion. MSOUTH's rcsour-
ccs and capabrlitres must be updated.
Altcmativell,. thc Alhancc could dnrde up
the Medrtenanean reglon Lnto hvo separate
subordinate commands - one for the u'estem
Medrterranean and the other for the eastem
Mediterraneans"
Although these are not officral Alhance proposals.
thc language ur u-llch thel are couched mav cause
conccm among the southem countnes unless the
Nhancc at the same ttme makes clearer uhat tts
polrtrcal rolc rs to bc ur the 2lst century.
138 NATO could for cxample give more acttve
consrdcratron than rt has to date to rval's rr ufuch rt
could medratc x'tth a \,re\\. to settlmg various
aspects of thc dsputcs bctuecn Grcece and Turkel'.
possrbll' under thc acgrs of a "contact group",
srmrlar to that prolrdcd for rn the Dalton Accords
Thrs mrght consist of thc Urutcd States. Greece,
Turkel'. C1prus and a small number of Alhance
members. particularh' thosc that guaranteed the
agreements glvmg C1prus utdepcndence
Orgamsation under NATO ausplces of a conference
of tlus small group u'ould har e thc advantagc of
bnngrng all the particrpants togcther on an equal
footrng rutlun an Alhance x'here thcv shared thc
same valucs
139 It rs clear that the full membershrp of Greece
m the European Uruon and ln WEU, to u'hrch
Turkev has been admrttcd as an "associate member"
on11'. drsquahfies both orgamsattons from actrng as
medrators rn dtsputes bet*'ccn Greece and Turkev
8 See Medrterrancan securiS' Nc*' challenges. ne\l'
tasks, .\-{ fO revt ev'. Ma1' 1996.
and also motivates Turkev to request full
membersh-rp and threaten repnsals rn areas m u'h,rch
they are feasrble. A specrfic example rn uluch tlus
mrght appl1, rvould be rf the Repubhc of C1prus, a
second Greek state. u.ere to lour the Europcan
Uruon. WEU or both. Tumrng a deaf car to
Turkrsh protests s'ould onlv sen'e to accentuate thc
Turkrsh populatron's impresston that rt rs berng
relected b1'the West and b1' Europe, ufuch could
have erlrcmclv senous and damagrng repcrcussions.
It rs for tlus rcason that vour Rapporteur considers
rt cssentral for NATO. and an1'other orgarusation n
u'hrch Grcecc and Turkev are represented on an
equal footrng. to appll'prcssure on both countries so
as to obhge thcm to embark on a senous search for
a settlemcnt to thcr brlateral problems 
- 
multrlateral
m the case of C1prus 
- 
on thc basrs of application
of the exrsturg treattes Such a scttlement has
become urgent nou' that the drfEercnces betn'een
Greece and Turkey ma)' u'ell prevent the
establishment of an order of peace and secuntv ur
the Medrterranean. and even dcvclopment of the
cooperation that is needed betu'een NATO, WEU
and the European Uruon
140 As regards the OSCE's Medrterrancan role, it
should bc remembered that tlus orgarusation, ufirch
noll'has over 53 members and covers a gcographrc
arca stretchmg from San Franctsco to Madrvostok,
uas dcsrgrcd to managc East-West confltct, totally
drfferent m nature to the problems ansing rn thc
Medrtcrranean basm. Moreover, given the very
large numbcr of non-Medrterrilnean countries. such
as Russn. u'luch mght usc thc OSCE as a rvav of
urterfcnng rn thc affairs of the regron. it is hard to
see horv that orgarusation could reall1'' help to
resolve drfficultres rn the Mcdtterranean The
relrval of a regronal mrtiative. such as the
Conference on Secunh' and Cooperatron rn the
Medrterranean (CSCM) 
- 
an tdca floated b1' Spatn
and Italy rr 1990 
- 
mrght. hon'el'er. bc consrdered
Nevertheless. the arm of that parttcular proJect \\'as
not conflict settlement but rather the creatton of a
forum rvhere agreement could be reached on general
pnnciples and rules to be follou'ed rn the evcnt of
cnsls Tlls rrutiatrve appears to have been largelv
superseded by' the Barcelona process.
IV. Conclusions
l. The conditionsfor a Meditenanean policy
l4l It ls pcrhaps premature to drarv firm
conclusions at tlus stage of the study', if only
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because further rrformatron on cerlain porrts is strll
lackrng. Hou€ver, the followrng observations are in
order.
although the stagnatron of the Middle
East peace process and uncertatnties over
developments ur thc situation in the Gulf
and along the borders of Turkey, Syna.
Iraq and Iran dommate the concerns of
those responsrble for peace and secunty
ur the regron. the nsk of further military
confrontation m this area does not appear
to be rmmrnent. On the other hand, a
u'ave of r.rolence and terronsm, tnggered
by radrcal movements such as Hamas,
mav be unleashed rn the occupied
temtones The danger of such violence
sprcadrng to other areas, such as Saudr
Arabra or even Jordan, cannot be ruled
out
142. It rs too earlv to sav xhether the success of
the process rnrtrated b1'the European Unron uith
the Barcelona Conference hinges on dcvelop-
ments in the situatron rn the Middle East and in
partrcular on the outcome of the peace process
Thrs apart. the Barcelona Conference offers too
general and drverse a framework to be able to
provide raprd solutions to the conflicts and crises
in various parts of the Mediterranean basin
143 Horvever. manv Arab countnes are most
anxlous for Europe to plav a major role in
handling the Arab-Israeli conflrct and restoring
balance rn the negotiatrons, u'hich are marked bv
far too much dommation b1,the United States A
prerequisrte for thrs is agreement among thc
European countrres on a corrrmon pohcy towards
the regron No such agreement has been achieved
to date. Hou'ever, certarn signs, such as the
hearing of Mr Yasser Arafat on 30 September
1996 b1,the mrnisters forming the EU Trorka. are
encouragmg Even though thc Arab countries
are wartmg for Europe to take a firmer stance,
Europeans must not be under anv illusion that
this might mean thel' u'ant the United States
excluded from a settlement to the conflrct
altogether. Whatever their feelings torvards
Washington, the1, know full well that only the
United States can influence Israeli policy'.
144. The differences betrveen Europe and the
United States over the policies to be pursued in
Palestine and rn relatron to Iraq and also over
u'avs of combatrng state terronsm, mcreasinglv
threaten to drsrupt thc entrre Euro-Amcrican
securih' pohq' cdrfice Whcn Europc cventually
manages to define a corrrmon policy. close
cooperation betu'een thc Europcan countrics and
the Unitcd States xould be hrghly' desrrablc and
profitable.
145 The prohferation of \\'eapons of mass
destructron and therr means of convevance,
destrned for non-European Medrterranean coun-
tries, continues to be a danger, first and foremost
for the countnes involved m conflrcts in the
regron. but there is nothrng to suggest that there
is an)' mrlrtan' threat to Europe from the
countries on the southern shore of the
Mediterranean.
146. The greatest challcnges for thc future of
Euro-Meditcrrancan relatrons are not thcreforo of
a military nature Ther'hc marnlv rn
drfferenccs rn economic developmcnt 
-
a proper partnershrp can onll' be
estabhshed betu'een countrres w'hose
economles are gearcd to reach the same
level. Thrs rs true of the problems
posed bv the entrl' of eastern European
states to the European Union and is
even more relevant in the case of the
partnershrp rvith the countries along the
southern shore of the Mediterranean
especiallv smce the oblectrve set b1,the
Barcelona Conference is to establish a
free-trade area bctu'een the countries to
the north and south of thc
Mediterranean br' 2010 At France's
msistencc. substantral funding (4 7
mrlhon ecus. or 6 milhon dollars. for
the perrod 1995-99) u'as carmarked by
the Cannes summit mcetlng of thc
European Councrl to help the southern
Mcdrterranean countries rmprove thcir
economres It ls essential for this
venture to succeed, otherwise the
strongest economies rvrll dominate
those of thc rveakest countries The
European Umon has never before
agreed to make such a huge financral
investment outside its otrn area:
- 
the development of cultural and social
ties to promote better understanding
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betu'een hvo cinlisations. one of wtuch 
-
rn the south too often feels
mrsunderstood, humrhatcd and even
scomed It rs rmportant to sholv that
Europe respects and seeks to understand
Islamrc cnrhsation provrded the lattcr
relects the dark forces working agarnst
the West from r,l'rthrn Islam and seekrng
to destabihse it through acts of terronsm.
a perrnanent dialogue shorving that
Europe long ago discarded the sombre
remnants of imperialism and that it is
not seekmg to impose soluttons inspired
by'rts oun s)'stems on its nerghbours in
the south.
- 
on the economic front. more care must
be taken not to tmpose an cconomic
model xrth a rvorldwide perspectlvc
that does not takc account of local
srtuations rn such countrtes. Thct' can
onh' adapt gradualll' to a market
economv and urll rvtsh to malntaln
state control ln some sectors,
- 
the search for a charter for stabtlttr,,
u'here the same cautious approach is
necessan' Your Rapporteur rYas
struck b1' the fact that because it is
advocatmg a stability' pact, Europe is
suspected of rvanting to exercise some
sort oftrght control over the region as a
u'hole Onlv a modest European
approach urll brrng success and u'ould
seem to be the most approprtate course




enc!' measures w'hose applicatron
u'ould bc voluntan'.
the notrficatron of manoeuvres. and
an exchange of information among
militan'staff.
147. At thrs stage rt rs not possible to estabhsh
a collective secuntv system. To begin urth,
countrres rn the south mvolved in a dispute
should simply have the option of recourse to
Europe This cautrous approach wrll develop
into somethlng more substantral as confidence
rs gradualll'burlt up.
2. An Arab policy for Europe
148. A concerted European policy tox'ards thc
Arab u'orld must bc onc of the essenttal
mgredrents maktng for stabrlrty tn thc
Medrterranean
149 Frrst prrncrple: a dialogue must be
conducted on the basis of understandrng and
estecm among equal partners. Thrs dialogue
must develop in mutual apprectatton of s'hat ue
are and u'hat gives us our identity. Our respect
for human rights and universal values of justice,
tolerance and hberty. coupled urth our destre to
sce them apphed to rvomen too, must not prevent
us from concedrng that these values manl' be
grven expressron ln different way's through our
rcspcctrl'e cultures and tradrtrons
150 Second pnncrple: x'e uphold the nght of a
people to frccll' determme tts dcstiny, assert its
rndcpcndcnce and exercrse rts rrght to secunt)'.
Thrs csscntral prrncrplc must apply'to all peoplcs
uithout exceptron. Some membcrs of the
Commrttce stressed that the notron of a peoplc
$as not l'er1' clear and that manv facttons of the
Medrterranean populatron as a u'hole u'ere not
averse to various forms of irredenttsm, not all of
rvhrch commanded the same respect In this
connectron, alongside the Kurds and the rvestem
Saharan people, thel' mentioned Gtbraltar,
Corsrca and claims concernmg Padenia. In y'our
Rapporteur's opiruon, the democratic practrces of
$'estem Europe leavc room for the crpression of
regronahst clarms and m some cases even allorv
them to create too much of a stir Freedom of
expresslon and the exerclsc of the right to votc
fulh' sanctron the exprcssion of popular fccling
and produce a maloritv rn favour of cxrstrng local
and regronal state instrtuttons If states agree to
glvc some satrsfactton to mlnonty potnts of vtcl,
partrcularlv rvhere thesc conccrn cconomic,
hngurstrc and cultural areas, and rvhere thrs is
compatrblc rr th the matntenancc of natronal
urutv and pubhc order. thel' havc the rrght 
- 
and
even the dutr'- to quell any recourse to vtolence.
15l Besrdes thrs, even' state's right to securitl'
obviouslv apphes to the state of Israel and thrs
makes it impossrble not to drau' a parallel
betu'een the Palestrnrans' right to independence
and securrtv guarantees for Israel, as the
rnternatronal commurutv has unceasmgly
affirmed since thc adoptron, in 1967, of United
Natrons Resolutron 242. u'hrch establishes a link
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bctrveen the Palestinrans' nght to "self-
determinatron" and the devolutron of "secure and
recognised boundaries" for the state of Israel
The French President, Mr Chirac. and thc Itahan
Prrme Minister, Mr Prodr, spelt out thrs messagc
1'et again u'hen thev vrsrted the Mrddle East in
October 1996.
152 Third princrplc \\'e support the Arab
peoples' asplratlons to sohdarrtt' and unitv As in
Europe. mdependence and closcr union can co-
exrst. u'hrch rmphcs that Europe should support
both the Arab Lcague and the regronal groups
that arc takrng shape rn the regron stretching
from the Maghreb to the Mashreq.
153 Fourth prrncrple u'e support the Arab
u'orld's aspiratrons to openness and peace We
stand rvith all those s'ho fight extrcmism,
fanatrcism and the forces of hate, u'herever thcv
crupt ln the s'orld. No-one rs safe from them as
the bloodl' tragedies in both thc Arab and
European countnes have shown.
154. It is necessarv first to takc stock of our
mutual mterests. The European Unron rs thc
Arab u'orld's foremost trading partner and the
second most important source of forergn
int'estment. In addrtron. Europc is its largest
donor and the brggest rcgron for Arab forcign
investments It can do much more much better
We must be ambrtrous and fulh, exploit our
complementary asscts
155. Ambitrons must not be confined to the
cconomlc spherc Relatrons must not be ordinarl,
or banal. Any tcndcncl' to sh1' an'av and anv
instinctrve mistrust must be overcome. The Arab
and European countries must understand that
thcv have conrmon interests and a corrrmon
destrnl'
156 Alongside what rs alreadl' an rntncate
netu'ork of cultural and cconomrc rclatrons, more
emphasrs needs to be givcn to a grand polrtrcal
desrgn. In the embryonrc multr-polar u,orld that
rs takrng shape. thc development of pou'erful
politrcal hnks betu'cen thc European and Arab
poles can be a source of common strength and
can create a balancc rn the relatrons that have
been forgcd u rth the u'orld's other major
communrties
157 Thc momentum for peace is irreversible
But it can bc slou'cd dorm and beset bv obstacles
thror,m down by extremists of all shadcs. as
recent tragedies shorv onll' too wcll. We must
pool our efforts, as we did rn response to the
rmpetus given by President Mubarak at Sharm-
el-Sherkh. to ensure that this peace to u'hrch all
the peoples of the region asplrc mo!'cs fonvard.
and to defeat terronsm.
158. At thrs cntrcal luncture. Europc must
shoulder rts responsrbrlitres It rs alrcady dorng
thrs ln economlc tcrms b1' supportrng the
Palestinran pcople as part of a huge financial
packagc to help the reglon as a whole,
reprcsentrng almost half the total amount of aid rt
recclves
159 Hou'cver, Europe cannot just be a provider
of funds. Morc than rt has done rn the past. rt
must make a political contribution to a peace
scttlcment and must also be a co-sponsor rn the
proccss. In thrs respect. the decrsron b1' the
Frfteen to designate a reprcsentatrvc rn the person
of the Spanish Ambassador to Isracl rs to be
u.elcomed. It rvas glven a favourable reccptron
bv Israel, u'hrch did no morc than express the
hope that Mr Martino uould coordrnatc his task
xrth all the parties mvolved. partrcularly Israel
The European Unron playcd a crucral role rn the
multrlateral negotiatrons on thc preparatron and
supervlslon of the Palcstrnran clcctrons, which
\\'ere a maJor success for democracl' But it must
go even further and grve fresh impetus to the
peace process. taklng account of even,bodr,'s
interests and the asprrations to secuntl'rrhich are
shared b1' one and all The commrtments that
havc alrcadv been entered into must be honoured
and thc agrccd trmetable kept to. The peace
proccss cannot stop at the half-s'ay stage All
thc partles involved must reach a 
.1ust and
balanced agrecment on the final status of the
Palcstinran territories. on the basrs of thc
princrple of land for peace. This agreemcnt
should also cover the most drffrcult rssucs such
as Jerusalem. thc srtuation of refugecs and thc
futurc of the settlcments. There rvrll bc no
lasting peace unless thc rrght of thc Palcstrnian
people to self-determrnatron and rts lcgrtrmate
aspiratrons to self-govcmment are respected.
160 Frnallr'. a lastrng peace must be based on
thc prcmrsc that Israel can hve rn securitv Only'
progress touards recognrtion of a Palestinian
rdentrtl' urll urpc out once and for all terrorist
threats nurtured bv isolation. bitterness and
frustratron In addrtron to the necessary' fight
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agamst terrorism, onlv mutual rccognitron and
gradual confidence-buildrng can tnsttl a cltmate
of security.
161 In the field of secuntv proper. Europe should
fully, support President Mubarak's proposal to
establish a zone free from \\'eapons of mass
destruction Tlus plan *'rll naturalll'have to rnclude
control procedures It could be accomparued by
confidence-burldrng measures and procedures for
resohrng conflrcts
162 But pcacc ur the Middle East must also
mclude settrng up an econonxc commurut)'. An
rntegratcd econonuc area needs to bc burlt up step
bv step, followrng thc example of Europe after the
u'ar In tlus respect Europe can usefull1' share tts
expenence and must also help bv proledrng
asslstance. caprtal and technologtcal knorv-ho$'.
163. The objective should be to create a zone of
prospenty as a result of the free mol'cment of goods
and persons. Such a zone. nhtch urll help close
gaps m development, can only' be burlt gradually
and the prqect must be camed out urth a great deal
of pragmatism Tlus is n'h1'. as a first step, the role
of the rvorkrng group for regronal econolruc
development should be strengthened
164 Othcr regronal projects should also
matenahsc so that the economic area gradually
becomes a cohcrent and urufied entrt-v. Followrng
the Casablanca and Amman surnmrts, the economic
conference of Mrddle Eastem and North Afrrcan
countnes, to be held rr Ca:ro towards the end of the
1'ear, uill mark a further step rr the nght drrectton.
165. The WEU Assembly' should nou' submit a
proposal beanng on an extremell' sensttive area,
that of rvater. From a source of conflrct, u'ater could
tum out to be a factor for cooperatron. The fight for
land must on no ac@unt become a battle over
water. Ttus is uh1'the countnes concerned should
be asked to drau' up a regronal charter defimng
agreed measures for the jornt marngement of rvater
supphes and uhy a proposal should be made for the
creatlon rr the Mrddle East of an rntemattonal
rnstrtute for the marngement and development of
rvater resources.
166 Arabs. Israelis and Europeans must
combrne therr skrlls to define and carry out
together other prolects. rn areas such as
agronomic research and tounsm for example,
that rvrll gradually move tou'ards regional
integration and bring about a greater degree of
harmony in the hearts and mmds of all those
rnvolved.
167 . Contrarl' to rvhat rs often sard. the
Mediterranean is a nerv idea in polrtrcs Since
the collapse of the Roman Emprre. the regron has
becn the focus of mrlitary and commerctal
rivalry. Europe's ambrtron norv is to turn a page
rn polrtrcal terms and make this one of the
Europcan Unron's fundamental goals. After
destrol'rng a rvall m eastern Europe. Europe must
nou'burld a bndge rn the south This rs lvhy it
had no hesrtatron rn supporting the Eglptian
initiatrve to crcate a "Mediterrarean forum". It
also explarns rvhf it launchcd the idea of the
Euro-Medrterranean Conference. held rn Barce-
lona in November 1995.
168. The ground has norv been cleared for
construction lvork on the Medrterrancan to begrn
Europe's ambrtion must be to burld a neu'
partnership around a sea that rvrll once agatn
fulfil its purpose as a focal point rvherc people
can meet, exchange vieu's and ltve tn peace rvtth
one another The great civrlisattons, whrch have
the Medrterranean as thetr cradle, must once
again learn to knorv and understand each other
169 Thrs Euro-Medrterranean area as described
does not )€t exrst - it has to be built. Its
constructron urll requre a great deal of resolve and
tenacq' from all the parties rrvolved 
- 
states,
busmesses and citrzens alfte The stakes are huge
as thel' hold the key to future peace, stabilrtv,
freedom and prospenlv on both shores of the
Medrterranean The objcctrve is clear: to reduce
divisrons, mrsunderstandrngs and drfferences
x'hether they be demographrc, economlc. cultural or
polrtrcal 
- 
betrveen the states and populations rn the
reglon.
170. Last June in Cannes, the European Union
set aside the fundrng necessary to achreve this
objectrve: almost 5 mtlhon ecus over 5 years,
which could be mcreased trvofold through loans
from the European Investment Bank and
supplemented by' bilateral contributions from
each EU member state This is an indication of
the effort to be made betrveen now and the end of
the centun' The distinctrve feature in the
Unron's approach to thc problem is to deal head
on rvith all the aspects of a partnership that lvill
be a valuable complement to the brlateral
relations unrtmg our countncs.
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l7l. Wrth the political aspcct its main feature,
this partnershrp rs to define a common area of
peace. Bv making a proposal at Barcelona for a
Euro-Mediterranean stabilrtl, pact to be estab-
hshed on a voluntan'basrs. Europe has shoun
that rt lrrshes to brrng states that observe
common rules closer together Such states must
agrcc among themselves on confidence-burldrng
measures and be determrned to pursue them in
their good-neighbourlv relatrons and through the
peaceful settlement of disputes. Securrty in the
Medrterranean depends first and foremost on the
mtemal stability'of the states in the regron and on
their abilrtt' to engage in preventrve diplomacv,
among other measures.
172 To mark the importance of this
partnershrp. the next conference on the
Mediterranean should be held at the level of
heads of state or government As a prrmarily
polrtrcal, but also of course an economic
grouping, the Euro-Mediterranean partnershrp
should in due course see the emergence of a zonc
ofshared prosperrty.
173. Taking bilateral assocratron agreements a
step further, the Euro-Medrterranean area must
eventually lead to the creatron of a free-trade
zone, thus complementrng the process of open
regronahsm that is developing throughout the
u'orld. Thrs process can temper thc harsh effects
of the phenomcnon of run-arvay globahsatron
that rs a mark of the trmes.
174. An overall economic approach of thrs sort
must be accompanied bl' many specrfic
partnership prolects in the fields of industrl, and
finance, enr,rronmental protection and the
management of resources.
175. Last but not least there rs the cultural
dimension of the partnershrp, which should be
given to promoting dialogue between peoples,
and primaril)' among voung people. Coopcratron
betu,een the major universrtres north and south of
the Mediterranean must be developed and
courses harmonised so as to increase possrbrlitres
for student exchangcs Teaching staff should
meet to rvrite course books together, particularlv
in the case of history', and there should be an
increase rn the number of joint audiovisual
proJects.
176. Building peace in the Mrddle East.
consolidating thc unity of the Arab world and its
ties, creating a genuine Euro-Medrterranean
partnership 
- 
these are ambrtrons u'ithm our
reach. pro.;ccts representing a u'ealth of promrsc
and shared hopes
3. A cautious approach
177 . The imphcations of Europe's desrre. as
expressed in Barcelona, to plav a rolc rn the
establishment of stabrlity ln the Medrterranean
and thc settlement of conflicts are that rt rs nou'
lookrng for mutual commrtments that urll
progressrvell'be put rnto effect
The first of these is:
- 
to adopt confidence-burldrng and
transparenc), measurcs x'hose apphca-
tion u'ould be voluntary'
178. It u'ould also be dcsrrable to take as an
example rvhat has alreadl'bccn done m Europe m
this connectron, particularh' as regards.
- 
the notification of manoeuvres, and
an exchange of rnformation among
military staff
179 Thrs procedure is comphcated by'the fact
that rssues are drscussed first by,the Frftecn and
thcn bv the Trvelve The EU membcr states have
not 1'et agreed on a Jornt posrtron erthcr at 15 or
at 12.
I80 In practice, a senes of sufficrently, credrble
measures rvrll have to be rvorkcd out as a ven,
first step tou'ards commitments on stability
This imphes that to begrn urth. Europe's
approach should be a modcst one. even though rts
ultimate objectrve is to go much further.
181 It u'rll take time to set up a collectrvc
securitv s1,stem. At this stage. the best that can
be donc rs to offer thosc southern countries
involved rn a dispute thc optron of recourse to
Europe.
182. This cautious approach lrrll develop into
something morc substantial as confidcnce rs
graduallv built up. For the time being. Europe
must prove to the Arab countries that they' can
rely' on its determination to shoulder rts
rcsponsibihties as regards stabrlrtf in the
Mediterranean. for if it fails to do so, the Unrted




Joint letter from the hesident of the French Republic,
Mr Jacques Chirac, the German Chancellor, Mr Helmut Kohl, and
the British hime Minister, Mr John Major,
to the hesident of the Palestinian Authority, Mr Yasser Arafut
(Poris, Bonn, London, 27 September 1996)
Mr President.
As vou knou', onlv thrs u'eek ue reccrved the Pnme Mmrster of the State of Israel. Mr Benlamm
Netanl'ahu. m order to examme urth lum the prospects for the Mrddle East peace process. He rnformed us of
lus ursh to complv wrth thc undcrtakrngs srgned and to contrnue the talks ruth the Palestrruan authonttes
Wc havc since expresscd our grave concern at the tragic events u'llch have ;ust unfolded rn thc
Palcstruan tcmtones and u'tuch could leopardrse thc Mrddle East peace proccss
We ursh. b1' u'a1, of tlus lornt formal appeal. to encourage vou to contmue to take all measures
nec€ssary to restorc calm. We are makrng the same emphatrc appeal to thc Pnme Mrustcr of the State of
Israel.
We considcr that rn the current crrcumstances both sides must shon' moderation and assume ther
rcsponsrbihties in full
We strongll'ursh to see an unmedrate resumption of negotratrons at thc hrghest level betn'een 1'ou and
Mr Benlamrn Netanyahu, on the basrs of terms agreed b1'the hvo srdes. Such negotiattons u'ould pronde an
opportuni['to examrne all the outstandrng lssues. and should cnable the agreements srgncd to be rmplcmented
rr fulI u'ith a vierv to agrcement berng reached on the final status of thc Palestuuan tcmtones.
Tlus appears to us to bc the only approach capable of bnngrng lasturg calm back to the temtones and
of ensunng the safeq'of all the peoples rrr thc region
We knorv that vour comrrutrncnt to the contrnuatron of the pcacc process will lead l'ou to do all that 1'ou
can to cnsurc tlnt common sensc and reason prevarl.




Joint letter from the hesident of the French Republic,
Mr Jacques Chirac, the German Chancellor, Mr Helmut Kohl, and
the British hime Minister, Mr John Major,
to the Israeli hime Minister, Mr Benjamin Netanyahu
(Paris, Bonn, London, 27 September 1996)
Dear Pnmc Mimster,
We ucre pleascd to receil'c I'ou tlus u'eek and to recmphasrse our frrendstup torvards the Statc of Israel
as u'ell as to examrne urth 
,vou the prospects for the peace process You rnformed us of 1'our concem to
rcspect the undertakrngs agreed and to pursue talks u'ith the Palestruan authontres We have smce cxpressed
our gra\€ concern at the senous events wfuch have lust occurred m the autonomous territones and u'hrch nsk
cndangenng the Middle East peace process.
Follourng on from our conversatrons wrth )'ou, we wish to make a joint and formal appeal to )'ou to
take the necessan' steps to restore calm Wc welcome the announcement of the decrsron to close the tunncl
under thc Holl' Cr['and rrrsh othcr measurcs to be taken m the same sprnt.
We consrder that everl,one involved should shou' moderatlon and carry out therr responsibilrtres.
We strongly uish to see an unmedrate resumption of the negotratrons at thc highest level betrveen
yourself and Mr Yasser Arafat, on the basrs of terms agreed b1' thc trlo sides We are makmg the same
appeal to the Presrdent of the Palestrman Authon[' Such negotlatlons uould provrde the opportruuty to
examrne all thc outstandmg ssucs They should cnable the signed agreements to be rmplementcd ln full, rn
preparatron for an agreement on the final status of the Palestuuan temtones
We regard tlus as the onll ual' of restonng lastrng peace rn the tcmtones and guarantecmg Israel's
sccuriqv.
We arc countrrg on )our authonW and your visron as a statesman to cnsurc tlnt lnsdom and peace
prevail. for the sake of all the peoples ur the region.




Morocco's approach lo security and defence in the Mediterranesn
Briefing given by Divisional General Abdelhak El Kadiri
of the Permanent Secretariat
of the Higher National Defence Council
on 29 October 1996
Morocco has ahvavs, and more especrallv so smce the 1980s. been a strong advocate of a regional
cooperatlon and development area berrg estabhshcd ur the Meditenanean and rvarmll'u'elcomed the success
of the Barcclona Conference u'hrch. after a numbcr of uutratives and several false starts, u'as held on27 and
28 Novembcr 1995. There, for the first timc it u'as possrble to grasp the full complext-v of Euro-
Medrterranean lssues, u-rth parhcular note berng taken of economrc and social rmbalances and the need to
promote the process of regronal rntegration through nerv decentrahsed cooperatton arrangements, and wrth
pnde of place berng grven to the concept of partnerslup
Thrs u'ould be a parbrershrp rooted rn the follorirng three pnncrples:
a corrunon area xhere peacc and stability would prevarl;
an area of shared prospentr'.
development of human rcsources and understanding betrveen cultures
Hou'ever. the WEU Assembly's ven' consrderable rntcrest rn the problems of our reglon predates the
Barcelona Conference and the WEU Mediterranean Group is engaged m dralogue urth Medrtelraneuur
countnes that are not members of the Orgarusation. on secunh,and defence matters rn u'hrch there is common
rnterest We feel that such dralogue rs greatly to bc rvelcomed for the contnbutron rt makes to regional
secunh'and bctter mutual understandrng, supplementrng and enhancing srmrlar acti',rties takrng place rn other
institutional framew'orks. It also proudes a vclucle for the useful contnbuflon WEU and its member
countncs. as the defence component of the Europcan Uruon. can make to a ne\\' approach to European and
Medrtcrrancan secu ritr issucs
I. Ihe common requirementfor a security policl,
Morocco consrders that peace, stabrlrtl'and secunq, rn thc Medrtelranean region should be a strategc
alrn. a cornmon good to be promoted and strengthened It rs of lrttle use. m m)' !'lcrv, to expect to develop a
partrrershrp betu'cen our tlvo opposite Medrterranean shores unless the pnncrples of peace and stabilrtv are the
comcrstones of an1' neu' regronal rdentrlv.
The Krngdom of Morocco. under the leadership of Fhs Majes[' Krng Hassan II. has. as 
.vou arc a\\'are,
long made thrs phrlosophl,and method of approach its oun As a country s'hich seeks to emulate the "golden
mean". Morocco beheves s'holeheartedlv rn the rartues of ncgotration and consultation and, b1'the same token.
has alrravs been an advocate of close and regular polrtrcal dralogue among the states along thc shores of the
Medrterranean and. more generallr', among the Euro-Medtterranean countncs
Such dralogue must be bascd on the pnncrples and prcccpts of mtemational lau', and implies
commrtrncnt to tcnets such as
compliance rvith the Unrted Nations Charter and the Univcrsal Declaratron of Human Rights.
consohdatron and stabrlrtl' of a state under the lau practrsmg democracv rn a freely chosen
cconomic and socro-political svstem.
respect for human rrghts and basrc hbcrtres,
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acceptance of the sovcreign equality of states:
respcct for the independence and terntorral integrrty of states;
no drrect or rndirect interference in the internal affairs ofothcr states.
peaceful settlemcnt of disputes and abnegatron of the threat or use of force
Europe can naturally contnbute a great deal m these areas After a strurg of earlier attempts 
- 
for
example the Five plus Five dialogue and the Medrtenanean Forum 
- 
fragmented approaches to Mediterranean
secunty have finall1' grven \\'ay to a global uritratrve on this issue wrthrn the boundanes of our reglon A
framexork and a formula along the same lines of thmkrng as for the Conference on Secunt_v and Cooperatron
m the Medrterranean (CSCM), drawrng on the methods and machrnerl' emplol'ed b1,the Orgarusatron for
Secunh'and Cooperation ur Europe (OSCE) but adapting them to thc particular featurcs and requirements of
the Medrtenanean, are not to be rejected out of hand. They' could pourt the uay ahead or at thc very least help
concentrate initratrves m this area
Seen ur ttus light. WEU 
- 
uhich you all represent 
- 
can prolrde a useful framework for drscussions
and suggcstions as part ofthe thought-sharurg process.
As I'ou are a\\'are, it u'as after the Petersberg meetrng in June l992lhat contacts uere esLablished wrth
Morocco and thee othcr Maghreb countnes (Mauntarua. Algena and Turusra). The proccss rvas extended to
Eglpt after thc WEU Mrristers' Kirchberg Declaration on 9 Ma1' 1994.
As vou also knorv, the resultrng dralogue has dealt urth secunty issues of corrrmon concem, on the
basrs of u'hat have become knoun as the scven Petersberg pnnciples: draloguc. transparencv, confidence,
conflict prevention, operational adequacl'. peaceful settlement of drsputes and non-proliferation of armaments.
Through its positrons. commrtnents and actions. the Krngdom of Morocco has demonstrated that rt fully
subscnbes to all thcse prurcrples.
In this connection rve noted with rnterest the decision taken b1' the WEU Council of Mrmsters on 15
May 1995 to create hvo mterventron forces - one land-based (Eurofor) and the other sea-based (Euromarfor)
- 
thus attesting to a neu' perceptron of secuntv problems rn the Medrterranean. Horvever WEU must not
allorv rtself to fall prey to the susprcions of those uho frequcntly refer to the "threat from the south".
It rvould bc to delude onesclf complctell' to supposc that peace and secunty rn the Mcdrtelrancan can
be marntarned srmpll'bl,bnngrng some krnd of policeman rnto the region What the Medrterranean needs to
do is to set up a conflrct-prevention and crisls-management system, especiall1, as these are areas u-here
exrstrng regronal s1'stems (UMA and the Arab League) have shoun lrttle sigr of berng effectrve, at any' rate up
to nolr'.
But Morocco's approach to securitv caru1ot be confined solely to the abovc aspects. It also takes on
board other sccunS'aspects connected uith crimcs such as smugglurg, drug traffickrng. the vanous forms of
traffic in human labour, terrorism etc As an observer member of the "K4" (formerly thc Tren Group) the
Krngdom of Morocco has on manv occasions set out its strategf in the strugglc against narcotics. It hopes for
more solidanq' and cooperation from Europe lr extermrnating such cvils and helping meet the condrtions
requrred for agncultural conversion rn the Rrf drstnct In the fight agarnst terrorism, Morocco's efforts to
marshall rts forces to combat the illegal arms trade, orgarused cnme, terronst intngue and the threat of
destabilisatron through Islamrst extremism and vrolence are unremittrng The situation rn Algena is rnevrtabll'
a cause of concem to us bccause of possible hnks urth gangs outsrde the country', especiallv rn Europe. Here
agam, there rs patentll' a need for close Euro-Medrterrancan cooperation, srnce, in vrerv of the rntematronal
character of such nctworks. rt is thc only'rva1' for us to rdentifi'. definc and resolve the secunq'problems of the
rcgion Moreovcr, ttus is also the mtentron belund the ongorrg dralogue urth thc Atlantic Alliance that
Morocco irutiated earlv m 1995. taking care to ensure that discussions are not confined to fears about
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fundamentahsm and arrnaments prohferatron rr the region (as former NATO Secretary4eneral Willy Claes
onginalll'uanted) but also deal with rrulitarv and secuntl'rssues of common concem.
II. Morocco's defence policy
Morocco's defence pohcl'florvs logrcalll,from rts national secunty doctnne, its alm beurg to defend the
temtorial urtegnq', urdependence and sovereigrrtv of the Kmgdom Ttls task also rmphes the defence of the
countryJs most hallowed institutions. Ever srnce Parhament rvas estabhshed, there has been a verv urde
consensus throughout the natron as to the role and funcilon of the Roy,al armed forces Thus national defence
budgets have urvanabll' been adopted unanrmously by the House of Representatrves. Srmrlarly, the natronal
political parties 
- 
r,'fiether of the rnaJont_v or the oppositron 
- 
have been unremittrng advocates of
strengtherung the natron's nulrtarl' potential to counter any nsk of destabihsation and ward off deviationist
subversion fomented abroad agarnst Morocco's recentll' recovered Saharan pro!1nces. Consolidating its
temtonal lntegntv is one of Morocco's maJor concems
You, as drsturguished members of the Assembly of WEU, do not need me to remmd you that for the
last tlurtv )'ears or so Morocco has had to cope wrth threats, tension, aggression even, from nerghbounng
countnes pursuurg covert actron calculated to destabrhse the region, or wrth zm eye to supremacy. However
due to the strength of the bond betu'een ths Malesty, Krng Hassan II and hrs people. the loyaltl' of the Royal
armed forces w'hrch are held m a constant state of readmess and also to the patnotism of the Moroccan people,
the country has been able, and has had the u'hereurthal, to safeguard rts temtonal lntegnt_v, sovereigrrty and
rrdependence.
Strengthemng our nulitarl,capabrhq,as requred has thus been one of our natronal pnonfles and places
a heaq'burden on the country's finances. Buildrng a chmate of confidence and secunty rn the regron rs bound
to put an end to an arrns race wfuch is our rnaJor concem in conncction urth the Euro-Medrterranean area.
Stemmurg drrectlr' from the Barcelona Declaratron and the Palrna Declaratron, resultrng from the
CSCE rn September 1990, a number of proposals have been put fonrard to grve form and content to the
Medrterranean Secunty Basket At its meetrng on 8 Apnl 1991, the European Council referred to tlus ur
positive and unambrguous terms.
Arrangements for regional cooperation rn defence matters cannot be drawn up until the underlyrng
causes of msecunty have been effectrvely dealt rnth. This can be aclleved only by' agrcemg at the same trme
to curtarl the more destabrhsrng effects of nulitan'competition
In ttus connectlon Morocco atLaches great u'eight to the development and urterpretation of European
secunty concepts and especially to WEU's perception of extemal threats from the southem Mediterranean
Bilateral rrulitary cooperation agreements have been concluded wrth most westem European countries.
In substance, they deal with aspects of a process Morocco is an"xrous to develop ut spccrfic fields of actron
officer trarmng, multiservrce and lourt exercises, techrucal assistance and vanous forms of military exchange
wrth France, Italy, Spam and Portugal (wrth reference to exrstmg defence agreements).
To the fullest extent that such cooperation permits, Morocco spares no effort to meet the requirements
of its European parbners' armed forces 
- 
both wrth regard to urtelhgence and certain operational facrlities.
An operatronal bngade-srze mrlitary force, hcld in constant readiness for action outsrde the country rn
the frameu'ork of humarutanan assrstance or peacekeeprrg and secunty enforcement task, and trained to be
interoperable, has been established by Fhs Majesty the Krng, Supreme Commander-rr-Chref of the Royal
Armed Forces. for action beyond the country's borders, u'henever required, under the auspices of either the
UN (Zarre, Somaha or the Gulf) or NATO (Bosrua), m accordance wrth the spint and the letter of the 1996
Constrtution, and rr particular the Prearnble thereto, in rvtuch Morocco reaffirms its determrnatron to work to
marntaur peace and secunty throughout the u'orld.
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Morocco. for its part, attaches great weight to tlus policl', utuch seeks to promote a chmate of
confidencp and secunty'ur the Medrterranean area.
In thrs same perspective, Morocco can but welcome urth mterest any proposal designed to secure arms
control, thus subordrnatrng purely mrlitary considerations to a urder pohcv drrected torvards a search for
peace rn a framework of secuntv and confidence.
Srrularly, Morocco has supported measures taken m urtemational bodres to prevent the spread of
nuclear, chemrcal and biological rveapons by subscribing unreservedly to all relevant agreements.
We regard ourselves as bound by a commrtnent of solidantv to achreve peace, cooperatron, stabrl[v
and secuntv rn our region. To tlus end, we have unremrttrrgh' pressed for consensus in order to guarantee the
condrtrons under llluch secunt-v, stabililv, cooperatron and development betn'een the hvo shores of the
Medrterranean can be safeguarded Parhrerslup and Euro-Medrterranean lornt development are rnseparable
from and complementary to political and nulitary detente.
The idea of a Medrtenanean stabilitv pact is a compelhng one. It has its attractions for us and yet
requires profound thought and more detarled studf in view of its many political consequences, but rt could
also have the advantage of encouragurg a fresh approach to secunty and defence problems in the region.
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